

The Politics of Home: Dual Citizenship and the African Diaspora¹

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In recent decades, more countries have started to recognize dual citizenship. Although overlooked in the literature, Africa is part of this trend with more than half of its governments now permitting their nationals to naturalize elsewhere while retaining home country rights. Why have some African countries embraced dual citizenship for emigrants, while others have not? We examine demographic, political, and economic data broadly across the continent and identify few clear patterns. We then explore the cases of Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, finding that dual citizenship policies are driven as much by politics as they are by economic or security concerns.

In recent years, many African governments have been reaching out to diasporas abroad to seek their economic and political participation at home. Countries such as Benin, Mali, Senegal, and Ethiopia have established ministerial-level offices to handle expatriate affairs. A few governments have tapped into existing networks of hometown associations. Several countries have extended voting rights to citizens living abroad. One diaspora-engagement strategy that has become increasingly common has been the adoption of dual citizenship laws. After years of resisting the concept, more than half of all African countries now permit their nationals to acquire foreign citizenship while retaining their home country rights. Other countries are considering dual citizenship measures but have not yet adopted them. Still other countries have sought to engage expatriates without granting them full rights of citizenship.²

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²Ethiopia, for example, issues identification cards to foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin, allowing them to travel, live, and work in Ethiopia without special permits.

Why have some African countries adopted dual citizenship, while others have not? What explains this expansion of citizenship to nationals living abroad, even as many African countries have become more exclusive in their definitions of citizenship at home?³ Conventional wisdom suggests that African governments have embraced dual citizenship as a way to foster economic ties with their diasporas and particularly to increase investment and remittances. On the other side, security concerns typically are seen as the major drawback of dual citizenship, raising questions about whether individuals can be loyal to multiple countries. Less consideration has been given to political motivations for the extension of dual citizenship rights, including the shift toward multiparty competition, the involvement of emigrants in homeland politics, and the need for African politicians to generate support and funding for their campaigns. Indeed, the push for dual citizenship may be driven as much by self-serving political interests as it is by broader concerns for national development.

This article examines the factors underlying the adoption of dual citizenship laws in many African countries. More specifically, it seeks to explain why some African governments allow dual citizenship for their nationals who emigrate abroad (i.e., retention of nationality) while others do not. The next section of the article explores existing hypotheses in the literature on dual citizenship, which has become increasingly common around the world since the 1990s. Although African countries have been part of this trend, very few scholars have incorporated African cases into their analyses. Subsequently, the article uses demographic, economic, and political data to look broadly across the continent and identify patterns. It then examines three case studies (Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya) to explore the politics of dual citizenship in each. In the end, I find that the recognition of dual citizenship rights in African countries is driven as much by political interests at the intersection between homeland and diaspora politics as it is by economic motivations or security concerns.

³Côte d'Ivoire is the most recent illustration of how efforts to exclude domestic groups from the rights of citizenship can fuel conflict and civil war. For more on exclusionary approaches to citizenship in the domestic African context, see a growing body of research on the politics of belonging (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2006; Marshall-Fratani, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006, 2007; Geschiere, 2009).

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS IN THE LITERATURE

There is a growing body of research on dual citizenship, in part because the recognition of such rights has become more common around the world since the early 1990s. Examining a dataset of 115 countries, Sejersen (2008) finds that nearly half now recognize dual citizenship, compared to just a handful in the 1950s. The study highlights regional differences, with acceptance of dual citizenship low in Asia and higher in Europe and the Americas; it does not include Africa, but suggests that the trend there is in the direction of increasing acceptance. Looking specifically at Africa, Manby (2009) finds that 30 of 53 governments permit dual citizenship, particularly for their nationals who naturalize elsewhere.⁴ African countries are not alone in their growing recognition of dual citizenship, but have tended to be overlooked in the literature.

Researchers have noted several reasons for the global expansion of dual citizenship over the past two decades. Most obviously, the increasing movement of people around the world has led to more who can claim multiple nationalities at birth. This includes children born to parents from different countries, for example, and children born in countries that recognize *jus soli* rights to parents from countries that have *jus sanguinis* rights (Martin and Aleinikoff, 2002; Sejersen, 2008).⁵ Increasing gender equality means that citizenship is no longer determined solely by the father; children can inherit citizenship from both mother and father (Martin and Aleinikoff, 2002; Howard, 2005; Sejersen, 2008). The decline of conflict among states, especially in Europe, also has led to greater tolerance of dual citizenship, as mobility increases and concerns about loyalty decline (Howard, 2005; Sejersen, 2008). Finally, in a context where basic human rights are expected to apply to both citizens and non-citizens, membership in a specific political community is less important (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple, 2004; Howard, 2005).

⁴The study emphasizes retention-of-nationality provisions in its coding. Thus, a country that allows dual citizenship for citizens from birth only (essentially retention of nationality) is coded as permitting dual citizenship.

⁵*Jus soli* ("right of the soil") policies grant citizenship to individuals born within the territory of the country, regardless of their parents' nationalities. *Jus sanguinis* ("right of blood") policies extend citizenship to individuals whose parent(s) are citizens of the country, regardless of the place of birth.

Even as these factors push toward the recognition of dual citizenship in general, they do not explain why some governments have granted such rights and others have not. Several scholars have examined variations in dual citizenship policies among countries within a region. This regional focus reflects the fact that policy motivations differ in countries of *immigration* versus countries of *emigration*. Focusing on older members of the European Union, which typically fall into the former category, Howard (2005) develops a “Citizenship Policy Index” that rates countries with respect to their tolerance of dual citizenship for immigrants.⁶ He finds that European countries have become more tolerant of dual citizenship since the 1980s, but important national differences remain. Although he does not explain the variation, he suggests that immigration politics may play a role. Comparing Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple (2004) find that dual citizenship rights are the result of inclusive notions of citizenship (represented by *jus soli*) coupled with multicultural policies to integrate immigrants. They argue that recognizing dual citizenship is path dependent, in that earlier developments (such as prioritizing gender equality) make it difficult to go in any other direction.

The issue of immigrant integration underlies debates about dual citizenship in many receiving countries. Advocates argue that recognizing dual citizenship increases integration by granting immigrants rights in their host country without requiring them to give up rights at home; critics counter that immigrants split their loyalties and thus are less integrated into the host society. Empirical studies suggest that dual citizenship increases immigrants’ social and economic integration (Jones-Correa, 2001; Cain and Doherty, 2006).⁷ On political integration, though, some scholars find that dual nationals are less engaged than their single nationality counterparts (Cain and Doherty, 2006; Staton, Jackson, and Canache, 2007), while others find they are equally or more likely to vote (Ramakrishnan, 2005). As others have noted (Aleinikoff, 2000; Mazzolari,

⁶The 0-to-6 index is based on three components: whether a country grants citizenship by birth to children of non-citizens (*jus soli*); years of residency required before an immigrant is eligible for naturalization; and whether naturalized immigrants can hold dual citizenship. It clearly is designed with a focus on receiving countries.

⁷Interestingly, the citizenship policies of home country governments also affect immigrants’ host country integration. Mazzolari (2009) finds that immigrants from Latin American countries that allow dual citizenship are more likely to naturalize in the United States and experience relative employment and earnings gains compared to Latin American immigrants whose home country governments do not recognize dual citizenship.

2009), concerns about divided loyalties have led some critics to equate dual citizenship with political bigamy. Dual citizenship also can have national security implications when under-integrated groups are recruited by terrorist organizations (Renshon, 2005). Thus, arguments for and against dual citizenship in receiving countries focus especially on the extent to which *immigrants* can (and should) be integrated into the host society.

In sending countries, on the other hand, debates about dual citizenship often revolve around maintaining connections with *emigrants*. For migrants themselves, dual citizenship means enjoying economic and political rights, such as the right to work and the right to vote, in both countries (Hammar, 1985; Renshon, 2005). For sending governments, recognizing dual citizenship is often seen as a way to foster economic ties with the diaspora. Nigeria, Africa's top recipient of remittances, recognizes dual citizenship for its emigrants; the government has attempted to connect further with the diaspora by consulting emigrants on political matters and by promising overseas voting (Obadare and Adebaniwi, 2009). Even as they promote economic ties, leaders of sending countries may be wary about the political and security implications of dual citizenship, in terms of both increased political competition and divided loyalties.

Several authors examine dual citizenship policies in Latin America. According to Jones-Correa (2001), sending countries adopt dual citizenship by following either a top-down or a bottom-up approach. The former refers to a policy instigated by governments with little pressure from their citizens abroad, while the latter is the result of lobbying by emigrants who translate their economic power into political leverage. Migrants from Ecuador, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, for example, obtained concessions from home country politicians who campaigned and raised funds in their communities. Building on this analysis, Escobar (2007) argues that the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes in the U.S. also contributed to the recognition of dual citizenship in Latin America; sending states wanted their nationals to be able to naturalize and protect their rights in the U.S. without losing rights at home. Diffusion effects were at work as well, she argues, as Latin American governments copied each other; up from just four in 1991, at least sixteen countries in the region now allow dual citizenship.

Moving beyond the distinction between countries of immigration and countries of emigration, Dahlin and Hironaka (2008) offer one of the few quantitative analyses of the factors that lead governments to grant dual citizenship rights. Drawing on a dataset of 102 countries around the world,

they find little support for the notion that countries with larger foreign-born populations face greater pressure to recognize dual citizenship. Instead, they argue that cultural identities are more important than demography. Specifically, they find that countries with assimilative citizenship policies,⁸ ex-colonies, and states that belong to many intergovernmental organizations are more likely to recognize dual citizenship. The study includes several African cases, though a few are coded incorrectly.⁹ The authors offer important insights about identity factors that shape citizenship policies, though their analysis is strangely devoid of politics.

In general, African countries and their citizens are understudied in this literature on dual citizenship. To date, most research on the African diaspora has explored its historical dimensions from slavery to the present (Akyeampong, 2000) or looked at the role of remittances in economic development (Harris, 1993). Recent studies have started to examine the intersection of homeland and diaspora politics, including the political impact of remittances (Obadare and Adebani, 2009) and the promotion of overseas hometown associations (Mohan, 2008). Along these lines, as more African states consider dual citizenship, it is important to understand the factors that lead some governments to adopt such provisions while others do not. As we have seen, existing literature on other sending country regions suggests several possible explanations, including demographic factors, historical patterns, economic motivations, and political dynamics. The following section considers these hypotheses in turn using available data from African countries.

EXPLAINING DUAL CITIZENSHIP

To evaluate existing explanations for dual citizenship policies, we need an overview of citizenship laws in Africa. A recent study sponsored by the Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) and the Open Society Justice Initiative collected and analyzed citizenship laws from throughout the continent (Manby, 2009). Among many dimensions it explored was the question of dual citizenship. The resulting table codes each country in the region as permitting (30 countries) or prohibiting

⁸Dahlin and Hironaka (2008) define an assimilative policy as one in which just one parent (not both) must be a citizen in order for the child to be granted citizenship.

⁹The authors wrongly identify Kenya, for example, as recognizing dual citizenship rights at the time of their study.

TABLE 1
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Explanatory factor	Countries that allow dual citizenship ^a	Countries that do not allow dual citizenship ^b	Significant difference?
Emigrants as a percent of the population 2005 (World Bank, 2008)	6.40	3.89	No ($t = 1.47, n = 53, p = 0.147$)
<i>Jus soli</i> policies (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2010)	19 of 28 countries (67.9%)	14 of 21 countries (66.7%)	No ($\chi^2 = 0.008, n = 49, p = 0.930$)
Remittances as a percent of GDP 2008 (World Bank, 2008)	3.5	3.48	No ($t = 0.014, n = 46, p = 0.989$)
Freedom in the World combined ratings ^c (Freedom House, 2010)	4.03	5.02	Yes ($t = 2.295, n = 53, p = 0.026$)

^aAfrican countries that allow dual citizenship (Manby, 2009): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, and Uganda.

^bAfrican countries that do not allow dual citizenship (Manby, 2009): Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

^cThe Freedom House combined ratings range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free); thus, a lower number indicates a more democratic system.

(23 countries) dual citizenship (Manby, 2009: 63). Although dual citizenship involves several components and is difficult to code as a binary variable (Howard, 2005), Manby's coding emphasizes retention-of-nationality provisions, which are the focus of the current analysis.¹⁰ In addition to being the most comprehensive and recent study of citizenship laws in Africa, therefore, it is particularly useful for exploring why some governments allow citizens to naturalize elsewhere without giving up their home country nationality. Ideally, we would use this as the dependent variable in a logistic regression. Because of the lack of time series data for the dependent variable and missing data for many independent variables, however, there are too few cases for a meaningful quantitative analysis. Instead, in this section, we consider each independent variable in turn and present the findings in Table 1.¹¹

¹⁰See note 3.

¹¹Some basic logistic regressions produced similar overall results. The only independent variable that had a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable (dual citizenship) was the level of democracy, especially when controlling for total levels of migration. Thus, a democratic country with high levels of emigration and immigration was most likely to allow dual citizenship. Results will be provided by the author upon request.

As discussed earlier, a commonly cited reason for the increased recognition of dual citizenship is the growing number of people who can claim such status (Martin and Aleinikoff, 2002; Sejersen, 2008). In the context of sending countries in Africa, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that states with large emigrant populations would be under pressure to recognize dual citizenship. A country with a high percentage of its citizens living abroad may face pressure especially to allow individuals who naturalize elsewhere to retain their home country nationality. Using 2005 data (World Bank, 2008), emigrants represent an average of 6.40 percent of the population in African countries that permit dual citizenship compared to 3.89 percent in those that do not, suggesting that countries with higher portions of emigrants are more likely to recognize dual citizenship. However, a two-tailed independent samples *t*-test shows that the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant ($t = 1.47$, $n = 53$, $p = 0.147$). Thus, we cannot conclude that this demographic factor is driving dual citizenship policies in Africa.

Another factor that has been considered in the literature on dual nationality is the extent to which citizenship laws promote immigrant integration. *Jus soli* policies are viewed as more inclusive because they allow children of non-citizens to become citizens at birth (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple, 2004). Although seemingly less relevant for sending countries than receiving ones, assimilative policies have been associated with a more permissive approach to dual citizenship more broadly (Dahlin and Hirokawa, 2008). In Africa, however, there seems to be no relationship between these two dimensions. Drawing on data from the Citizenship Laws Dataset (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2010), 33 of 49 African countries in the dataset follow *jus soli* policies, but they are proportionally split between those that allow dual citizenship (19 countries) and those that do not (14 countries).¹² The countries with *jus sanguinis* or mixed systems are similarly split (nine versus seven countries). Thus, as confirmed with a chi-square test ($\chi^2 = 0.008$, $n = 49$, $p = 0.930$), there is not a clear association between *jus soli* and the recognition of dual citizenship in Africa.

It is common when comparing African countries to consider whether present-day laws reflect different colonial legacies. On this issue,

¹²There could be a coding problem with the data. The AfriMAP analysis notes that many African countries appear at first to follow *jus soli*, but a closer examination of their regulations proves otherwise. That study does not attempt to classify African states according to a simple dichotomy of *jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis* (Manby, 2009).

as seen above, Dahlin and Hironaka (2008) find that ex-colonies are more likely to recognize dual citizenship. Nearly all African countries were colonies, so this factor does not explain variation within the region, but it is possible that different European powers left distinct legal codes that led to different policies on dual citizenship. Again, though, there is no consistent pattern. Former French colonies are nearly as likely to prohibit dual citizenship (10 countries) as they are to permit it (11 countries); the same is true of former British colonies (7 versus 9). Former Belgian, Spanish, and Italian colonies are also divided on the issue. Interestingly, all five former Portuguese colonies in Africa recognize dual citizenship. This could reflect Portugal's history as a sending country that allowed dual citizenship for its emigrants (Howard, 2005), but the same could be said about Italy, Spain, and even the United Kingdom. Instead, this finding may be a result of the small number of former Portuguese colonies in Africa and possible diffusion effects among them.

Existing literature suggests that migrants use their economic power to pressure home country governments to enact dual citizenship provisions (Jones-Correa, 2001). Based on this logic, countries that are more dependent on remittances would be more likely to recognize dual citizenship because they do not want to risk losing that income. According to the most recent data from the World Bank (2008), remittances represent an average of 3.5 percent of GDP in African countries that permit dual citizenship, only slightly higher than 3.48 percent of GDP in countries that prohibit it. An independent samples *t*-test confirms that the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant ($t = 0.014$, $n = 46$, $p = 0.989$).¹³ Of course, even if there were a difference, it would be difficult to determine causality in that dependence on remittances could push governments to allow dual citizenship or, conversely, the recognition of dual citizenship could lead to higher remittances. The timing of such policies in relation to remittance levels is important, therefore, as explored in the following section's case studies.

Although the literature only hints at it, another possible explanation for the recognition of dual citizenship by some African governments is the nature of each country's political institutions. Citizenship in an

¹³It is worth noting that Lesotho, where remittances represented 27 percent of GDP in 2008, greatly increases the average of the countries that do not recognize dual citizenship. Even if this outlier is excluded, however, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant ($t = 1.515$, $n = 45$, $p = 0.137$).

authoritarian context does not mean as much as it does in a democracy, where it includes the right to participate in choosing leaders. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that emigrants (and their allies at home) would lobby more strongly for dual citizenship provisions after their home country has experienced a democratic transition. Looking at data from Freedom House (2010), which scores countries in half-point increments from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), African countries that permit dual citizenship appear to be more democratic. Their average Freedom House score is 4.03, compared to 5.02 for countries that prohibit dual citizenship. A two-tailed independent samples *t*-test shows that the difference between the two groups is statistically significant ($t = 2.295$, $n = 53$, $p = 0.026$). We must be cautious about this finding because of problems with the Freedom House scale and indeed with all democracy measures (Vreeland, 2008; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2009), as well as the question of whether a difference of means test can be used with such data. Even so, as explored further in the case studies below, the push for dual citizenship clearly has been spurred on by the process of democratization in several African countries, suggesting that the political context plays an important role in the reconsideration of citizenship laws.

Overall, with the possible exception of the political environment, there are few underlying conditions that seem to explain the variation in dual citizenship policies among African countries. The absence of obvious patterns in the quantitative data suggests that the recognition of dual citizenship is a process to be examined in its specific social, economic, and political context. To gain a better understanding of what has led some African countries to recognize dual citizenship, therefore, we must look at the story behind such laws (what led to them, the debates surrounding them, their timing in relation to political and economic changes, etc.). The next section of this paper explores these dynamics in Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya.

CASE STUDIES

To better understand the recognition of dual citizenship by African governments, it is useful to look at a few cases. Of the three countries examined here, Senegal is the most permissive on this issue. The government has allowed dual citizenship since independence and has made it possible for Senegalese living abroad to vote in elections since the early 1990s. Ghana recognized dual citizenship in the mid 1990s, though implementation did

not begin until 2002; a more recent law gives emigrants the right to vote. Even so, current regulations place restrictions on dual nationals, specifically when it comes to holding public office. In Kenya, dual citizenship has been under consideration for years. In August 2010, voters finally approved a new constitution that allows citizens by birth to acquire citizenship of another country while retaining their Kenyan nationality. Each of these cases is explored in the following sections. Admittedly, the selection of these cases is not random.¹⁴ Nevertheless, these cases reflect the range of dual citizenship policies and the timing of their implementation across the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Several other cases, including those that have not moved toward allowing dual citizenship, are discussed briefly in the conclusion.

Senegal: Dual Citizenship from Above

Senegal gained independence from France in 1960. Its first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, held dual Senegalese–French nationality, a detail that illustrates Senegal’s policies on dual citizenship for emigrants. Citizenship is based on the Code of Nationality of 1960, which was later amended in 1989. If a Senegalese citizen acquires citizenship of another country, she/he remains a citizen of Senegal, although second citizenships are not formally recognized until the individual is legally released from his/her Senegalese citizenship. In other words, while Senegal does not explicitly encourage dual citizenship, the law does not bar Senegalese nationals from acquiring a second citizenship nor does it require renunciation of Senegalese citizenship upon naturalizing in another country. Moreover, the Constitution does not prohibit dual nationals from holding public office in Senegal; in fact, as with many senior officials over the years, a recent minister of finance reportedly holds both Senegalese and Canadian citizenship.

In addition to long-standing dual citizenship provisions, more recent efforts have sought to facilitate greater involvement of the Senegalese diaspora in homeland affairs. Since 1993, the government has made it possible for emigrants in several countries, including France, Canada, Italy,

¹⁴Collectively, the author and two research assistants have significant experience in Kenya and Senegal; indeed, one assistant holds dual U.S.–Senegalese nationality. Ghana was chosen as a middle ground between these two cases, both in terms of when it adopted dual citizenship and with respect to the restrictions it has placed on dual nationals.

Germany, and the U.S., to vote in elections (Vengroff, 2007). In 1995, the government established the *Haut Conseil des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur* (HCSE), which has 75 members, 45 of whom are chosen directly by the president; the remainder are elected by representatives from diaspora associations (M. Diallo, 2010). An organ of consultation, the HCSE is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. Senegalese emigrants also have four representatives in the Senate, among 65 directly nominated by the president. Thus, Senegal's policies reflect an inclusive approach toward nationals living outside the country.

The fact that Senegal has always allowed dual citizenship makes it difficult to pinpoint motivations, though the timing of recent diaspora initiatives provides additional evidence. Studies of the Senegalese diaspora tend to revolve around their economic connections with the homeland. Fall (2005), for example, examines the Soninké of northeast Senegal, a considerable number of whom responded to France's call for foreign labor in the 1950s. In addition to establishing support networks there, they transferred money to their home communities and funded development projects. In so doing, migrant associations supplanted the failing state and earned gratitude from Senegalese politicians (Fall, 2005). In 2006, remittances to Senegal totaled \$925 million, up from \$233 million 6 years earlier; at 7.1 percent of GDP, this was the highest proportional contribution among the countries examined here (World Bank, 2008). The nearly fourfold increase in remittances reflected a global pattern, facilitated by economic growth and technological changes, and probably was not a direct response to the long-standing provision of dual citizenship or the diaspora-related initiatives of the early 1990s. It also pre-dated the 2007 creation of a Senate with four seats to represent the diaspora. Even so, recognizing the economic contributions made by emigrants and perhaps seeking some credit for them, Senegalese policymakers established institutions to reflect the importance of the diaspora.

There are few perceived security concerns with respect to the recognition of dual citizenship for Senegalese emigrants. This is most obvious when one considers that dual nationals have held some of the highest positions in government, including that of president. The low level of concern about divided loyalties may reflect Senegal's relative political stability over the five decades since independence; its most significant conflict during that time has been an internal struggle with separatists in the southern Casamance region. Another possible explanation for the apparent lack of concern about the security implications of dual citizenship is that

most Senegalese who have acquired a second nationality have done so in countries such as France, Canada, and the U.S., which historically have had good relations with Senegal.

Although given less attention, there also are political motivations for Senegal's extension of dual citizenship and other rights to emigrants. Politicians understand the importance of the diaspora not only to economic development but also to the political process. Senegal is one of few African countries to have permitted multiparty competition since independence, though the Socialist Party (PS) dominated electoral politics for 40 years. In 1981, Senghor turned power over to a hand-picked successor, Abdou Diouf. Eventually, in 2000, longtime opposition candidate, Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was elected president, facilitating the country's first transition to another party. For years, leading political parties have relied on Senegalese living abroad¹⁵ for campaign contributions and, since the extension of voting rights in the early 1990s, for votes. Compared to smaller parties, the party in power (PS then PDS) has enjoyed greater financial and political capabilities to mobilize supporters and to run campaigns in diaspora communities. In this respect, it was no surprise when President Wade used the occasion of an official visit to the U.S. to announce his intent to run for a third term in 2012 (Voice of America, 2009). Thus, political rights for emigrants, including dual citizenship, voting rights, and institutional representation, have been embraced by successive governments in Senegal and have not become a partisan issue.

In contrast to countries where diaspora groups lobby for dual citizenship, there is little evidence of a "push" factor in Senegal. With dual citizenship having been permitted for decades, Senegalese emigrants have not needed to pressure officials in Dakar for such rights. Even with more recent programs to engage the diaspora, the process has been driven largely by elites and has not been demanded by emigrant groups. In fact, as discussed below, some newly created diaspora institutions have been criticized by the very emigrants they are supposed to represent. In this sense, Senegal can be considered an example of the "top-down" approach to dual citizenship (Jones-Correa, 2001). In some ways, though, the distinction between emigrants and elites is a fuzzy one; Senegalese elites have a long tradition of moving among countries, especially Senegal and France,

¹⁵Official data show an emigrant population of 463,403 in 2005 (World Bank, 2008), but unofficial estimates are much higher. It is difficult for any government to keep track of the exact number of citizens who emigrate abroad.

and often maintain homes in multiple places.¹⁶ Thus, many members of the Senegalese diaspora are elites who have close connections with political leaders at home (whether in the ruling party or among the loyal opposition). As such, they benefit most from dual citizenship provisions that allow them to move freely among countries.

Beyond dual citizenship and voting rights, the creation of institutions to represent the diaspora also reflects political considerations. The Senegalese Senate is largely ceremonial, so the four diaspora representatives nominated by the president have minimal political influence. Similarly, with 45 of its 75 members chosen by the president, the HCSE is hardly representative. Instead, Fall (2010) contends, these institutions are political tools of the government and the diaspora has little real influence. Recently, emigrants have protested against the undemocratic and non-representative character of the HCSE. In France, for example, a dozen Senegalese associations circulated a petition to denounce the lack of transparency of the Council and its ineffectiveness in addressing their issues. They noted that the HCSE representatives chosen for France are all members of the president's political party (I. Diallo, 2010). Given the role of the president in selecting delegates to "represent" the diaspora, these institutions seemingly are designed more to boost the strength of the ruling party than to give a true voice to emigrants.

In Senegal, therefore, the recognition of dual citizenship and other rights for emigrants reflects a range of political and to some extent economic motivations. Remittances no doubt have helped Senegalese families, but in the eyes of politicians, they provide an opportunity to expand revenues and to make up for shortfalls in development budgets. The high mobility of elites has meant that many of the beneficiaries of inclusive diaspora policies are people with connections to those in power; in this sense, their political involvement typically has not been seen as a threat. Even so, as the HCSE example suggests, politicians have tended to manipulate the diaspora to advance their own political agendas. They rely on emigrants for campaign contributions and stack diaspora institutions with people favorable to their own interests. Given its long-standing policy on dual citizenship, Senegal is unlikely to witness a heated debate on the subject; the current system provides migrants opportunities both at home and abroad, while the government can use the diaspora to further

¹⁶Over the last several decades of his life, as noted in many obituaries at his death in December 2001, former President Senghor split his time between France and Senegal.

its political and economic goals. As emigrants become frustrated by their lack of real political influence, however, they may push for changes to the very institutions that claim to provide them with a voice in homeland politics.

Ghana: Dual Citizenship from Below

The quest for dual citizenship for Ghanaians living abroad (commonly abbreviated GLAs) has taken place in the broader context of political liberalization, as discussed below. In 1996, the government repealed the pertinent section of the 1992 constitution and accepted the notion of dual citizenship, but did not provide explicit provisions for its implementation. The Ghanaian Citizenship Act of 2000, which took effect in 2002, clarified the process by which Ghanaians could acquire a second nationality or, in the case of those who had been forced to denounce their Ghanaian citizenship to naturalize elsewhere, reclaim it. The law also lists several government positions that cannot be held by dual nationals, including Supreme Court justice, ambassador, cabinet secretary, and military colonel. In addition, based on a clause in the 1992 constitution, dual nationals presumably are not qualified to be members of parliament, though there is debate among lawyers about this issue. In the face of such restrictions, some Ghanaian expatriates continue to lobby for what they consider to be the full rights of citizenship (Djaba, 2008).

Soon after dual citizenship became a reality, a struggle emerged over voting rights for Ghanaian emigrants. In 2005, the government, led by the New Patriotic Party (NPP), introduced the Representation of Peoples Amendment Law (ROPAL) to allow citizens living abroad to vote in national elections. The bill sparked protests among members of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the former ruling party that was then in opposition, who argued that overseas voting could not be monitored sufficiently and could be used to rig elections. They also expressed concern over implementation costs (Oduro, 2009). The bill's passage became possible in 2006 only when NDC lawmakers walked out and a vote was held in their absence. Logistical difficulties prevented the implementation of ROPAL for the 2008 election, and the victory of the NDC in that contest suggests that little will be done to facilitate overseas voting anytime soon. Ghana thus has a more restrictive approach to dual citizenship than Senegal. Emigrants have the right to naturalize abroad without losing their home country nationality, but are limited in terms of which

offices they can hold; they also have not yet been allowed to vote in national elections.

Although driven by a variety of factors, advocates of dual citizenship and related rights have emphasized the economic contributions of the diaspora. Over the past two decades, remittances have become increasingly important to the Ghanaian economy (Manuh, 1998). In 2008, according to official figures, Ghana received \$128 million in remittances, more than it had in any previous year and double what it received 5 years earlier (World Bank, 2008). This figure does not include unrecorded flows, which government officials believe dwarf formal numbers; in 2006, the president claimed that remittances were \$4 billion (World Bank, 2008). Whatever the exact figure, remittances are significant. As President Kufuor acknowledged in 2001, "on the national level, this is a crucial component of our revenue, and, on the individual level, there are many Ghanaian homes today that rely to some extent for their upkeep on these remittances" (Kufuor, 2001a). A study of Ghanaian remitters found that they tend to send money over a longer period of time than other emigrants (Bump, 2006), suggesting that remittances will play an important role in the Ghanaian economy for years to come. With respect to policy incentives, though, it is worth noting that Ghana's decision to recognize dual citizenship came before the most dramatic increases in remittances over the past decade.

Security concerns may have motivated the Citizenship Act's identification of government positions for which dual nationals are not eligible, especially those pertaining to the army and security apparatus and ambassadorial posts. These are sensitive positions for which national loyalty is important, and it is not unusual for governments to clarify citizenship questions under such circumstances. Even so, there is no evidence of significant public discussion in Ghana about the security implications of dual citizenship nor of the possibility that enemies would exploit such provisions to infiltrate the government. As a result, and because the law also includes a range of less sensitive positions for which dual nationals are ineligible, many GLAs view the restrictions as driven by political rather than security concerns. Indeed, some expatriates have complained about being second-class citizens because they are barred from key posts (Djaba, 2008). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that security considerations may have played some role in the limitations that have been placed on the rights of dual nationals.

Despite the underlying influence of economic and security factors, debates about dual citizenship and other emigrant rights in Ghana

increasingly have been politically driven. The push for dual citizenship arose in the context of political liberalization starting in the early 1990s. After coming to power through a military coup d'état in 1981, President Jerry Rawlings faced growing pressure for political reform. In 1992, in line with changes elsewhere in Africa, his government oversaw the development of a new constitution that provided a framework for multiparty competition. Much to the disappointment of GLAs, who wanted to participate in the new system, the constitution did not recognize dual citizenship at that time. With explicit and implicit advantages of incumbency, Rawlings won multiparty elections in both 1992 and 1996 to extend his time in power. In 2000, when Rawlings was forced by term limits to step down, his NDC was defeated and the NPP's John Kufuor became president. Eight years later, in a rarity for an African country, power once again shifted from one party to another when the NPP candidate was narrowly defeated in presidential elections by the NDC's John Atta Mills. It is against this backdrop that the push for dual citizenship gained relevance and strength.

In contrast to Senegal, the demand for dual citizenship and associated rights came mainly from the Ghanaian diaspora, particularly in Canada and the United Kingdom (Rahemtullah, 2007). Although official figures claim 906,698 Ghanaian emigrants in 2005 (World Bank, 2008), unofficial estimates go as high as three million. Unlike Senegalese expatriates, many of whom are elites with close connections to the government, the Ghanaian diaspora includes many people who fled Ghana for political and economic reasons during the Rawlings era. Because of the perception that they were opponents of Rawlings (Mohan, 2006), many GLAs felt that his government dragged its feet on dual citizenship in the 1990s. They pointed to the fact that it took 4 years after the 1996 amendment permitting dual citizenship to enact legislation providing for its implementation; the Ghanaian Citizenship Act eventually was passed in December 2000, weeks before elections that would bring a new party to power, but did not take effect until 2002. After years of lobbying for the right to participate in the newly liberalized politics of their homeland, Ghanaian emigrants saw dual citizenship as long overdue.

In recent years, debates about the political rights of the Ghanaian diaspora have taken on a partisan dimension. After the 2000 election resulted in the transfer of power from the NDC to the NPP, Kufuor embraced the recently passed dual citizenship measure. He reached out to GLAs in his inaugural speech, recognizing their efforts to end the NDC's

dominance: “I must acknowledge the contributions made by our compatriots who live outside the country. ...Many of you do more than send money home, many of you have kept up keen interest in the affairs at home and some of you have even been part of the struggle of the past twenty years” (Kufuor, 2001b). The NPP government subsequently took a proactive stance toward the diaspora (Mohan, 2006), implementing the dual citizenship provisions and introducing the bill to allow expatriates to vote. This record contributed to the fear among NDC politicians that overseas voting would be used to strengthen the NPP’s hold on power, fueling their resistance to ROPAL in 2005 (Oduro, 2009). With the NDC’s return to power after the 2008 elections, though, the longtime ruling party once again has a chance to woo the diaspora. Whether emigrants will embrace the party of Rawlings remains to be seen, but it is clear that both major Ghanaian political parties are looking to emigrants for votes and, perhaps more importantly, campaign contributions.¹⁷

Overall, the recognition of dual citizenship and other rights for Ghanaian emigrants has been driven largely by politics, particularly in the context of democratization. There is no doubt that the economic contributions of the diaspora are important, but these increased most after the decision to grant dual citizenship rights. In many ways, GLAs have used remittances as a justification in their campaign to gain more political rights. The fact that many expatriates are disappointed because they are restricted from holding a few key government positions suggests broader political motivations. Inside Ghana, the discussion of rights for the diaspora also has become politicized. More than any other country discussed here, clear alignments have emerged in terms of which party is perceived as supporting expanded rights for emigrants and which party is opposed. Even so, in contrast to Senegal, both major political parties in Ghana seem wary of allowing dual nationals to hold senior government posts. This could reflect security concerns, even if they have not become prominent in public discussions; just as likely, though, is the possibility that politicians want to avoid competing with well-resourced expatriates for these positions. With the Ghanaian diaspora mobilized around these issues and partisan divisions emerging, it will be interesting to see how these debates are resolved.

¹⁷According to Mohan (2006: 878), “it is widely rumoured that the latest [NPP] election victories were bankrolled by migrant Ghanaians.”

Kenya: Delayed Promises

Kenyan politicians have promised dual citizenship to emigrants for years, and especially since the democratic transition in 2002, but only after the passage of a new constitution in 2010 are such rights becoming a reality. During the long and contentious process of developing a new constitution, as discussed below, dual citizenship provisions were incorporated into several drafts. However, because of incessant political wrangling about unrelated issues, those drafts were rejected by politicians or the Kenyan public. It was not until August 2010 that a national referendum approved a new constitution, which allows dual citizenship for emigrants. This provision was clarified further with the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2011.

While politicians were debating, other branches of government moved ahead on diaspora rights. In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and National Development worked with businesspeople and diaspora representatives to explore ways to maximize contributions of the diaspora. The resulting report recommended recognizing dual citizenship and allowing Kenyans living abroad to vote. It also suggested the creation of special economic zones to channel investment and a Council of Kenyan Diasporas to represent their interests (Republic of Kenya, 2007). In January 2010, a court ruling also moved toward recognizing dual citizenship. The case, challenging the results of a parliamentary election, was brought by a Kenyan who moved to Australia and acquired citizenship there. In response to an effort to dismiss the case because of the petitioner's nationality, a High Court justice ruled that the petitioner was still a citizen despite having naturalized elsewhere because he held a valid Kenyan identity card and passport and had not explicitly denounced his Kenyan citizenship.¹⁸ The ruling is now moot given the subsequent recognition of dual citizenship rights in Kenya, but it raised the hopes of thousands of emigrants when it was issued.

In promoting the recognition of dual citizenship, emigrants and government officials have focused especially on the economic justifications. Remittances to Kenya have increased dramatically in recent years, from \$538 million in 2003 to \$1.69 billion in 2008, and represent more than 5 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2008). Although the recession may cause

¹⁸*Mahamud Muhumed Sirat v Ali Hassan Abdirahman & 2 others* [2010], High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 22 January 2010. The full text of the ruling is available via <http://www.kenyalaw.org>.

those numbers to dip, remittances have become one of the top sources of foreign exchange for Kenya. These figures have been mentioned repeatedly by Kenyans pushing for dual citizenship rights and are recognized as well by government officials. The 2007 diaspora report discussed earlier devotes a full chapter to remittances and makes specific recommendations to streamline the process and provide additional incentives for Kenyans in the diaspora to send home money (Republic of Kenya, 2007). While this economic factor frequently is used as an argument in support of dual citizenship, it is worth noting that remittances to Kenya rose substantially even before the recent recognition of those rights. It is not clear, therefore, that the recognition of dual citizenship is necessary to protect remittances as a revenue stream.

Security concerns have not been a focus of the deliberations about dual citizenship in Kenya, but were raised by a few critics. People do not worry much about Kenyans who emigrate to the U.S. or Britain and naturalize there; conflicts with these countries seem unlikely. The larger question is what dual citizenship means for refugees and others who come to Kenya from Sudan, Ethiopia, and especially Somalia. Given the large ethnic Somali population in Kenya and the history of irredentist claims among Somali leaders, critics of dual citizenship raise legitimate concerns about people who want to hold dual Kenyan–Somali nationality. In part reflecting this concern, the relevant article in the 2010 constitution focuses only on Kenyan citizens by birth who naturalize elsewhere and does not discuss immigrants to Kenya.

As in Ghana, the push for dual citizenship in Kenya is best understood in the broader context of political liberalization. Discussions of the issue started in the early 1990s, when longtime President Daniel Arap Moi agreed to allow multiparty competition. He did little to respond to emigrants' desire to participate in the new system, in part because of the perception that many Kenyans living abroad were opposed to his government. After narrowly winning elections in 1992 and 1997, thanks to state-instigated violence and a hopelessly divided opposition, Moi agreed to step down and hold fair elections in 2002. This time, the opposition came together and Mwai Kibaki was elected president. Even as emigrants increased their calls for dual citizenship and seemed to find receptive ears, Kibaki's coalition government started to fall apart, limiting its ability to enact anything. Indeed, in 2005, a key factor in the public's rejection of a proposed constitution (that incidentally would have recognized dual citizenship) was the support of the Kibaki government (Whitaker and Giers-

ch, 2009). The political drama continued in 2007, when Raila Odinga challenged his former coalition partner for the presidency. Despite early returns suggesting an Odinga victory, Kibaki was abruptly declared the winner and inaugurated for a second term. The violence that followed left 1,300 Kenyans dead and another 300,000 displaced. Eventually, a power-sharing agreement in late February 2008 gave Odinga the newly created post of prime minister and required politicians to negotiate a new constitution within a year. That deadline came and went, thanks again to political wrangling, but a new constitution eventually was approved in an August 2010 referendum. It included a provision that politicians of all stripes had long claimed was not controversial: the recognition of dual citizenship for emigrants.

Throughout this process, the push for dual citizenship came primarily from the diaspora, though many politicians and officials expressed support for it. Although the World Bank figure is lower,¹⁹ the government estimates that there are approximately 2 million Kenyans living abroad, mainly in the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom (Republic of Kenya, 2007). Many fled the country for political and economic reasons during the Moi years. After the 2002 transition to a more competitive (if flawed) electoral system, some Kenyans returned home; others stayed in their adopted countries but continued to be engaged in home country politics. There has been an active campaign by Kenyan emigrants, waged in part through online networking sites such as Facebook,²⁰ for the government to recognize dual citizenship and extend voting rights to the diaspora. Some emigrants became frustrated that dual citizenship rights took so long to be granted given the frequent lip service by politicians, though they knew that few measures are passed quickly by a notoriously slow and divided Kenyan parliament.

Kenyan politicians frequently have expressed support for dual citizenship, but took years to make it a reality. The location and timing of such promises are telling. Politicians often travel to the U.S. and Britain, where they speak to diaspora groups and hold fund-raisers. It is in such contexts that most pledges for dual citizenship have been made. In 2007,

¹⁹According to the World Bank (2008), there were 427,324 Kenyan emigrants in 2005. The number may be lower than government estimates because it includes only citizens, not those who have acquired other nationalities.

²⁰See, for example, the Kenya Community in Diaspora and its spinoff groups on Facebook.

an election year, at least two presidential candidates and one government minister pledged support for dual citizenship while traveling abroad. Subsequently, two more ministers and President Kibaki himself expressed similar views in speeches to Kenyans in the U.S. (Kariuki, 2008). Information is not available about how much money was raised at these events, but politicians would not continue to make such trips if they were not lucrative. Once they returned home, however, the issue was on the back burner. Indeed, we were unable to find any statement about dual citizenship made by a politician while in Kenya. Before dismissing this as “out of sight, out of mind,” it is useful to consider that recognizing dual citizenship may be politically unwise for members of parliament. If emigrants hold citizenship, some may return to Kenya and run for office. Thus, some Kenyan emigrants believe that the delay was deliberate.²¹ Politicians promised dual citizenship to raise campaign funds, but then stalled the recognition of such rights to avoid competition.²²

After years of unfulfilled promises by Kenyan politicians, the 2010 constitution allows dual citizenship for emigrants. Policymakers have long recognized the economic contributions of the diaspora, which increased dramatically even without dual citizenship, but squabbling over a variety of other issues stalled any effort to grant emigrants political rights. Although none will admit it as a deliberate strategy, politicians frequently promised dual citizenship while on fund-raising trips abroad, but did little about it upon returning home. After the recent passage of a new constitution, as Kenyan policymakers wrestle with the details of implementation, they are unlikely to adopt the permissive approach of Senegal. Indeed, the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2011 imposes strict penalties for not disclosing dual citizenship and for using dual citizenship to facilitate criminal activity. Although

²¹The author is grateful to Kinuthia Machaira for pointing out these dynamics in a conversation at the African Studies Association annual meeting in New Orleans in November 2009.

²²One other aspect of the debate in Kenya is worth noting. After the 2005 constitution was rejected by voters, several lawmakers suggested that dual citizenship could be recognized through a simple amendment, but Kibaki insisted it should be part of a new constitution. It is unclear why the president would resist implementing dual citizenship on its own, but it is possible that he wanted it in a draft constitution as a way to generate support. After having failed to deliver on his 2002 campaign promise of a new constitution, Kibaki may have been looking to include as many carrots as possible in the new draft that finally was approved in 2010.

details are still being finalized, provisions at the time of writing do not appear to prevent dual nationals from holding certain public offices, though that could change.

CONCLUSION

In the past two decades, more countries around the world have recognized dual citizenship. Although Africa is overlooked in the literature, it is very much part of this trend. Thirty countries in Africa now permit dual citizenship for emigrants, and others may do so in the future. Looking at quantitative data from across Africa, it is not clear that any specific demographic, economic, or historical factor makes some countries more likely to allow dual citizenship. There are no significant patterns between the recognition of dual citizenship and the relative size of a country's emigrant population, *jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis* rights, the former colonial power, or its dependence on remittances. This last finding is somewhat surprising, given the tendency of dual citizenship advocates to emphasize emigrants' economic contributions. Indeed, as the case studies show, such policies often are implemented in the context of rising remittances from abroad. On average, though, African countries that recognize dual citizenship do not receive significantly more remittances as a percent of national income than those that do not.

In contrast to these variables, there is some quantitative evidence that democratic countries in Africa are more likely to allow dual citizenship than their authoritarian counterparts. The role of political institutions has received little attention in the literature on dual citizenship, but the connection finds additional support in the case studies discussed above. Political factors seem to influence the recognition of dual citizenship in three ways. First, debates about dual citizenship in Africa have been spurred on by the process of democratization. This is most obvious in the cases of Ghana and Kenya, where the 1990s shift toward multiparty politics prompted emigrants to lobby for political rights. Such deliberations were not taking place in the 1980s, when citizenship involved few rights and open debate about such topics was discouraged. In Senegal, both multiparty competition and dual citizenship have been permitted for decades, but additional rights (overseas voting and institutional representation) were extended to the diaspora as politics became more competitive in recent years. This link between democratization and dual citizenship does not hold true everywhere; Nigeria, for example, first recognized dual

citizenship during a period of military rule.²³ In countries like Tanzania, Liberia, and Uganda, though, ongoing processes of political liberalization have been accompanied by lively debates about dual citizenship for emigrants.²⁴ Looking beyond Africa, many Latin American countries recognized dual citizenship following the 1980s wave of democratization in that region.

Second, the case studies suggest that the decision to recognize (or not) dual citizenship may be influenced by the perceived political leanings of the diaspora community. If emigrants are seen as opponents of the ruling party, policymakers may be less inclined to grant them political rights. If they are supporters, on the other hand, extending such rights can be a strategic move. As we have seen, many of the people who benefited from Senegal's early recognition of dual citizenship were government officials and their allies, thus allowing dual citizenship posed little threat to the ruling party. In contrast, as Ghana and Kenya liberalized in the 1990s, longtime authoritarian leaders (Rawlings and Moi) seemed wary of dual citizenship. Many emigrants had fled during the 1980s and were perceived (often correctly) as opponents of the ruling party. In Ghana, dual citizenship eventually was recognized as Rawlings was on his way out and was not implemented until a new party came to power; overseas voting subsequently became a heated partisan issue, with Rawlings' NDC as the primary opponent. In Kenya, it took a party transition and years of wrangling to pass a constitution recognizing dual citizenship; with an ineffective power-sharing government in place and 2012 elections approaching, the implementation of this policy could easily become politicized. Beyond these cases, one could speculate that Ethiopia's refusal to grant emigrants dual citizenship (opting instead for special identification cards) may be influenced to some extent by the activism of diaspora groups against the current government (Lyons, 2007). Dual citizenship policies may be driven in part by the political

²³When Nigeria eventually moved toward political liberalization, its 1999 constitution limited dual citizenship rights to citizens by birth and barred dual nationals from holding certain public offices.

²⁴Uganda passed a law permitting dual citizenship in 2009. In a situation reminiscent of Kenya, Tanzanian leaders promised to implement such a measure in 2010, but have not yet done so, in part because of the vocal opposition of some prominent academics. In Liberia, where the formal recognition of dual citizenship rights would affect thousands of refugees from the earlier civil war, politicians only recently started considering the matter.

interests of the ruling party, therefore; once granted, however, it is unlikely that such rights would be taken away.²⁵

Third, as suggested by the case studies explored here, African politicians may be walking a fine line on the issue of dual citizenship between trying to gain support (financial and electoral) from emigrants while at the same time avoiding direct political competition with them. Although more research is needed in this area, it is clear that democratization has created a situation in which African politicians regularly travel overseas to raise funds for their political campaigns at home. Democracy is expensive, even in poor countries, and parties must find ways to finance rallies, publicity, and other aspects of their campaigns. Promises for dual citizenship often have been made to diaspora groups during such visits. Upon returning home, however, few politicians treat dual citizenship as a policy priority. This was seen especially in the case study of Kenya, but also has played out in neighboring Tanzania, where dual citizenship still is not permitted. Few politicians would admit to a deliberate strategy, of course, but some may understandably fear the competition that could come from recognizing dual citizenship and paving the way for well-financed emigrants to return home and run for office. Though typically couched in terms of security, such political considerations may play a role in the decision in many countries to restrict the public offices for which dual nationals are eligible. Based on the limited evidence presented here, this possibility warrants further exploration.

In the end, while many scholars and organizations focus on the economic involvement of African emigrants, this paper reminds us that we cannot ignore their political participation in their home countries either. Indeed, as we have seen, debates about dual citizenship often take place at the intersection between homeland and diaspora politics. These debates are likely to become even more common in the future. As more African countries recognize dual citizenship, diffusion effects will put pressure on neighboring countries to do the same. There are some places where debates about emigrant rights will be especially interesting, including Liberia, which was mentioned earlier, and southern Sudan. Millions of Sudanese refugees fled their country during decades of civil war, and some have since acquired citizenship in the U.S. and elsewhere. Overseas voting procedures allowed them to vote in the January 2011 referendum on

²⁵This draws from the notion of dual citizenship as a path dependent process (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple, 2004).

independence, which resulted in the creation of the world's newest country in July 2011. The new government undoubtedly will be under pressure to recognize dual citizenship and allow former refugees to return home and participate in politics. Many emigrants have developed extensive overseas networks that could give them a financial advantage, but critics could potentially question their decision to flee instead of fighting against the northern government. As these dynamics play out in South Sudan and other African countries, the question of recognizing dual citizenship may become even more politicized.

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