Chapter 3
The Train Has Left the Station: Latino Aging in the New South

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Introduction

Nowhere in the United States has seen a more rapid growth of the Latino population in recent years than the South. In the 1990s the region, and especially Georgia and North Carolina, became a popular destination for many different people because of its booming economy, low cost of living, and temperate climate. References to the "new" South reflect this dynamism, moving away from traditional images of economic backwardness and racial segregation (Weeks et al. 2007; Smith and Furuseth 2008). Since it is a new migrant destination, the region's Latino population is quite young and to this point has little direct political influence. Indirectly, influx of Latinos has created an initial backlash, largely due to the fact that a high proportion of adults are undocumented immigrants. The politics will almost certainly shift over time, however, as the Latino population ages and continues to increase as a share of the total population. In this analysis we demonstrate what we mean by "the train has left the station" by employing a unique set of population projections stretching to the year 2040.

Using U.S. Census data and other sources to develop projections, the core of our argument is that as the cohort of older (65 years and over) Latinos grows in North Carolina, there will be concomitant political shifts. Children who are citizens will eventually become eligible to vote, legislative districts will be transformed, and Hispanic adults will be taking care of a growing elderly population. Although much has been written about Latinos and politics, almost no work has addressed the issue of aging more specifically.

The percentage of the Latino population eligible to vote will be much larger by 2040 than it is currently, which will slowly—and imperfectly—increase that popu-

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lation's political leverage. At the same time, we examine how electoral politics, especially gerrymandering, suggest that the South will have a different experience than other parts of the United States because of race. The chapter will first discuss the methods used to generate the population projections, analyze the results, and proceed to examining the potential political ramifications of the likely demographic changes that the New South will experience over the next several decades.

Background

As we have argued elsewhere, understanding migration patterns from Latin America to the United States, and to the southeastern part of the country specifically, requires examining demographic "irresistible forces" (Weeks and Weeks 2010). This refers to the demographic transformations taking place in both Latin America and the US that are drivers of migration, mitigated, of course, by economic and political factors. Although at times it can seem like irresistible forces of demography are meeting politically immovable objects, we contend that they are powerful enough that they cannot be legislated away. In other words, policy makers can respond to demographic forces, but cannot eliminate them or wish them away.

What does that mean? Although it is slowly coming to an end, the boom years of the 1990s and early 2000s were marked by a "demographic fit," whereby a youth bulge in Latin America coincided with a youth "dent" in the United States as the population has been growing increasingly older. Just as jobs—many of them physically demanding—were plentiful in the United States, there were too few young people to take them. Meanwhile, in Latin America (and, of course, particularly Mexico) there were too many young workers for too few jobs. The result was a migration surge, and the New South was a major destination.

Policy reactions in the United States can be best understood from a political demography standpoint. The influx of migrants fostered hostility in some quarters, which led to increased federal enforcement budgets along with state and local restrictions on undocumented immigrants. Paradoxically, the increased border security since 9/11 has served to "fence in" undocumented immigrants who previously would have circulated between Mexico and the US. The increased risks and costs of crossing the border have led to people staying once they safely cross into the US, thus giving rise to the unprecedented increase in the number of undocumented immigrants (Massey 2008). Given the demographic reality, however, there was no way to stop the forces underway. Those irresistible forces are literally changing the face of the South.

In this chapter, we extend our previous study from the historical and contemporary perspective to consider the future. Over the past two decades, economic growth in the South combined with the demographic fit drove large scale in-migration of relatively young workers and their families, often with children born after the parents' arrival in the US and who are thus United States citizens. That has brought with it a host of economic and political challenges that include a strain on public

Table 3.1 Latino population in the New South, 2010. (Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010 Census of Housing and Population)

State	Population in 2010		Percent Latino
	Total	Total Latino	
Georgia	9,687,653	853,689	8.8
North Carolina	9,535,483	800,120	8.4
Virginia	8,001,024	631,825	7.9
Arkansas	2,915,918	186,050	6.4
South Carolina	4,625,364	235,682	5.1
Tennessee	6,346,105	290,059	4.6
Louisiana	4,533,372	192,560	4.2
Alabama	4,779,736	185,602	3.9
Mississippi	2,967,297	81,481	2.7
Total	53,391,952	3,457,068	6.5

schools, use of federal and state social services, and the appropriate application of law enforcement, not to mention myths and outright untruths about the economic impact of undocumented immigrants. As we look ahead to 2040, however, the issues shift as the older population grows and those who are currently children simultaneously become political participants and caregivers to their aging parents.

For the purposes of this study, we define the "South" as states that were part of the Confederacy, but that also previously did not have any experience with Hispanic migration. Therefore Florida and Texas are excluded, leaving Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. These are all states that seceded from the Union but were also historically non-Hispanic. That is no longer true, as can be seen in Table 3.1, which shows the total and Latino populations for each state as of the 2010 Census. There were nearly 3.5 million Latinos in the nine southern states in 2010, accounting for 6.5% of the population. The three most populous states of Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia are disproportionately home to Latinos, accounting for 50% of the total population in the nine states, but 66% of the Latinos. The state we will examine in most detail is North Carolina which, as we show below, is projected to have the highest increase in its Latino population over the next three decades.

Population Projections Taking Hispanic Population Growth into Account

The U.S. Census Bureau no longer produces state-level population projections, so we have generated our own projections for each of the nine states of the "New South." We have projected the population out to the year 2040 on the assumption that policy initiatives should reflect the possible demographic changes taking place

in the next few decades. Too short a time frame (e.g., a single decade) is unlikely to capture the trajectory of change that should be accounted for, whereas projections over too long a time frame (e.g., a half-century) will have such high levels of uncertainty that they may not be useful for policy purposes.

Our projections utilize a sophisticated cohort-component method of projection (Smith et al. 2001; Swanson and Tayman 2012), with which we are able to model the projections separately for Latinos and non-Latinos, and separately for males and females within each group, on the basis of the beginning age structure in each state according to the 2010 Census, taking into account the different patterns of fertility and mortality for the two groups, and then making differing assumptions about the future pattern of migration into each state. For both Latinos and non-Latinos we held the mortality and fertility schedules constant over time at the circa 2010 levels, applying national level data to each state, in the absence of state level data for all states. The projections are based on 5-year age groups, and so the population is projected forward 5 years at a time.

Mortality data were drawn from the 2008 life tables by race/ethnicity produced by the US Centers for Disease Control (Arias 2012). These were the most recent life tables available at the time we began our analysis. Life expectancy at birth for Latino females in 2008 was 83.3 years, compared to 80.7 for non-Latino white women and 80.6 for women of all race/ethnic groups combined. We used the latter as a proxy for the non-Latino population, recognizing that it is a conservative approach since life expectancy would be somewhat lower for this group had we been able to take out Latinos from its calculation. For Latino males, life expectancy in 2008 was 78.4, compared to 75.9 for non-Latino white males and 75.6 for all males. These data show that we can expect a higher fraction of Latinos to survive into old age than is true for the rest of the population, so that alone has implications for future patterns of aging.

Fertility data refer to 2010 and are also from the US Centers for Disease Control (Martin et al. 2012). The total fertility rate (expected number of lifetime births based on current age-specific fertility rates) for Latino women in 2010 was 2.35 children. For non-Latino whites, the rate was 1.79, for all groups combined the rate was 1.93, and for non-Latinos it was 1.83. In this case, we do have non-Latino birth rates, so we used them instead of the figure for all groups combined. As of 2010, Latino women were having 0.5 more children each than were non-Latino women, and this implies that the Latino population will be an ever increasing share of the younger ages in the population out to 2040, where our projection ends. It is likely that Latino fertility will drop over time at the national level, especially considering that the total fertility rate in Mexico is now down to 2.2 children per woman. However, to the extent that Latino migration into the New South is driven especially by undocumented immigrants (Weeks and Weeks 2010), the Latino fertility in this region is likely to remain above the average for Latinos nationally, and thus above the non-Latino level.

The combination of mortality and fertility levels implies that the number and percentage of Latinos at both the younger and older ages will increase over time in each state, even if there were no continued in-migration of Latinos. In fact, the

decade between 2000 and 2010 witnessed high levels of migration into all of the states of the New South. What if this was to continue unabated out to 2040? That possibility represents our "high" projection scenario, in which the 5-year net migration rates (in-migrants minus out-migrants) experienced by each age, sex and ethnic group (Latino or non-Latino) in the 5-year period before the 2010 Census are held constant for each subsequent 5-year period up to 2040. The "low" scenario maintains the rates for non-Latinos, but then applies the non-Latino migration rates to Latinos. Thus, in the low scenario we assume that Latinos had a one-time increase in migration between 2000 and 2010, and then reverted to the level of non-Latinos beyond 2010. The net migration data by age, sex, and ethnic group are drawn from the work of researchers at the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison (Winkler et al. 2013), which are available for download on the internet at http://www.netmigration.wisc.edu.

We believe that the high projection has a low probability of occurring, since it represents the likely upper limit of the impact of Latinos in the New South. The region saw tremendous Latino growth in the 2000–2010 period, at a rate that is difficult to imagine continuing. Its value lies in showing us what is at least possible, even if not likely. The low projection has a higher probability of occurring than does the high projection, but we believe that the low projection is an underestimate of what policy-planners should expect. Serendipitously, as we were undertaking our population projections, a group of researchers at the University of Virginia completed and made available their set of state-by-state population projections (Demographics and Workforce Group 2013). These projections are also out to 2040, and are based on the Hamilton and Perry (1962) method, which is "a reduced form of the cohort-component method that requires less detailed data and captures the major components of population change (births, deaths, and migration) in a general way" (Demographics and Workforce Group 2013, p. 1). They also produced projections for Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations in each state, allowing us to compare their projections (which we refer to as the "medium" projections) with our high and low scenarios. Their "medium" projections fall within our high and low projections (with one exception discussed below) but they are not consistently closer to either our high or low projections, probably because they chose to mitigate the state-level impact of the high 2000–2010 migration rates of immigrant groups by applying ratios for data at the national level to the state-level data, whereas we used state-specific migration rates for Latinos and non-Latinos.

What Do the Population Projections Tell Us?

The major conclusion from the three sets of population projections is that, as we imply in the title of the paper, the train has left the station when it comes to the Latinoization of the New South. This is especially noticeable at the younger ages, since migrants tend to be young adults of child-bearing age, and they are indeed having children. But the Latino population will almost certainly become an increas-

ingly larger fraction of the older population in the South, with a burgeoning group of younger people, most of them citizens due to their birth in the US, who may be politically active on behalf of themselves and the elderly within the Latino community. Table 3.2 summarizes the three projections—high, medium, and low—for the total population in 2040.

It is striking that by 2040 even the low projection suggests that nearly one in ten residents of the New South will be Latino, with the percentages even higher than that in North Carolina (the highest at 12.1%, Georgia, and Virginia. Only Alabama and Mississippi are substantially below the regional average). The high projections show that in North Carolina nearly one in four residents could be Latino by 2040, and more than one in five in Georgia and Virginia could be Latino. The medium projections also show the power of the growth in the Latino population, with 17% of the population of both Georgia and North Carolina projected to be Latino. Five of the nine states are above 10% even in the medium projections. Again, only Alabama and Mississippi are bucking the regional trend, but the Latino population will still be a higher fraction of the total population in 2040 than it was in 2010.

Turning now to specific age groups of interest, Table 3.3 summarizes the results for each of the nine state of the New South, with states ordered by the proportion of the younger population that was Latino as of the 2010 Census. North Carolina and Georgia have been the most attractive destinations for Latinos, as we discussed earlier, with Virginia close behind. North Carolina and Georgia boomed in the 1990s, the former with growth related to banks and the latter sparked by the Olympics. Those created jobs and then a host of ancillary low-wage employment. In these three states, even the medium projections suggest that at least one in five people under the age of 20 in 2040 will be Latino. Furthermore, by 2040, even the low projections in each of those three states suggest that one in 15 older people in 2040 will be Latino.

It can be seen in Tables 3.1 through 3.3 that the least attractive state in the South among Latinos is Mississippi, and this state provides the one exception to the generalization that the University of Virginia projections lie between our high and low projections. At ages 65 and older, our high projection suggests that 2.5% will be Latino, while our low projection is at 2.3% and the "medium" projection is 2.7%. The difference is caused by the fact that between 2000 and 2010 older people of all ages, but especially Latinos, were experiencing net out-migration from Mississippi, a phenomenon not picked up by the University of Virginia projection method.

The decision to leave a state is based on a number of factors, and one that is particularly difficult to predict is political. Along with Alabama, Mississippi enacted some of the harsher state-level laws aimed at undocumented immigrants, such as requiring immigration checks of anyone who is arrested. It is difficult to measure the emigration impact of such laws, but reasonable to suggest that a reputation for hostility (combined with a long history of discriminatory practices) could well act as a prompt to migrant residents to leave as well as a deterrent to would-be migrants. Our projections seek to take demography into full account, but changes in political climate can happen quickly (or, indeed, be reversed).

Table 3.2 Projections of the total Latino population (all ages) to 2040. (Source: See text for derivation)

State	Projection of the total population			Projection of Latino population			Percent Latino		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
Georgia	13,929,731	13,599,293	12,376,706	3,003,522	2,309,259	1,450,497	21.6	17.0	11.7
North Carolina	14,213,002	12,892,556	12,235,221	3,455,767	2,190,853	1,477,987	24.3	17.0	12.1
Virginia	10,585,660	10,415,576	9,470,130	2,130,326	1,554,133	1,014,796	20.1	14.9	10.7
Arkansas	3,725,042	3,465,661	3,311,585	718,728	452,488	305,270	19.3	13.1	9.2
South Carolina	6,379,894	5,991,058	5,600,679	1,171,901	612,245	392,687	18.4	10.2	7.0
Tennessee	8,509,284	7,918,884	7,374,310	1,615,802	756,735	480,828	19.0	9.6	6.5
Louisiana	5,107,369	4,751,516	4,672,177	1,216,589	446,524	290,808	23.8	9.4	6.2
Alabama	6,241,523	5,538,151	5,315,742	677,748	355,264	242,556	10.9	6.4	4.6
Mississippi	3,402,457	3,337,170	3,140,740	372,923	178,247	111,206	11.0	5.3	3.5
TOTAL	72,093,961	67,909,865	63,497,290	14,363,305	8,855,748	5,766,635	19.9	13.0	9.1

Table 3.3 Percent Latino by age group in 2010 and in 2040: three projections

State	Percent Latino among less than 20 years of age				Percent Latino among 20–64				Percent Latino among 65+			
	2010	2040 high	2040 medium	2040 low	2010	2040 high	2040 medium	2040 low	2010	2040 high	2040 medium	2040 low
North Carolina	13.1	27.6	23.1	15.1	7.8	28.1	17.1	12.8	1.4	8.5	7.5	6.7
Georgia	12.3	23.5	22.3	14.3	8.4	24.8	16.7	12.3	1.9	8.6	8.1	6.8
Virginia	10.8	22.4	20.0	12.9	7.8	22.9	14.9	11.2	2.0	8.6	7.8	6.8
Arkansas	10.3	23.7	18.3	11.9	5.9	21.7	13.0	9.7	1.0	6.5	6.0	5.0
South Carolina	7.4	17.9	14.2	8.6	5.0	23.4	10.4	7.6	1.0	8.9	4.7	3.8
Tennessee	7.0	20.6	13.4	8.3	4.3	23.2	9.6	7.0	0.8	4.4	4.0	3.3
Alabama	5.8	17.9	11.3	6.8	3.8	25.3	8.2	6.0	0.8	3.6	3.3	2.8
Louisiana	4.8	14.7	9.9	6.0	4.4	15.6	7.3	5.4	2.1	4.8	4.5	3.8
Mississippi	3.5	11.2	7.2	4.1	2.8	13.9	5.3	3.8	0.7	2.5	2.7	2.3



Fig. 3.1 Counties with 10% or more Hispanic in 2010 New South

Figure 3.1 uses Census data to show where Latinos have settled in the New South, based on 2010 Census data. They are dispersed, though there is a clear preference for North Carolina and Georgia, which have the greatest number of census tracts with populations that are 10% or more Hispanic. In general, there are more in the northeast part of the region and fewer in the southwest part.

Figure 3.2 shows the spatial clustering of Latinos by county in the New South in 2010, based on the same data as Fig. 3.1. We used the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic to measure clustering (Getis and Ord 1992; Mitchell 2005). Hot spots are clusters of counties in which the proportion Latino among neighboring counties is higher than would be expected by chance alone, whereas cold spots are counties in which the proportion Latino among neighboring counties is lower than would be expected by chance. Thus, positive values of Gi* that exceed a z-score of 1.96 (the 0.05 level of statistical significance) indicate spatial association of high values (hot spots) and negative values of Gi* that are less than −1.96 indicate spatial association of low values (cold spots). Hot spots are especially noticeable through the entire central section of North Carolina, as well as in the area surrounding Atlanta (both of which we would expect), a swath of agricultural counties in southeast Georgia and the southern tip of South Carolina, and agricultural counties in western Arkansas. Cold spots are in the Appalachian range in western Virginia, as well as in parts of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana (with the exception of New Orleans, which is a Latino hot spot). These hot and cold spots are generally consistent with the idea that



Fig. 3.2 Spatial clusters of Hispanics by county 2010 New South

Latinos are migrating to places with above average economic opportunities. This matches anecdotal evidence about the popularity of these locations for Hispanic migrants.

The Implications of an Aging Latino Population

Currently, the Latino population is quite young. As we can see in Fig. 3.3, the small retirement-age population is concentrated largely in pockets in Virginia, Georgia, and Louisiana (specifically New Orleans). Nonetheless, like the general population there is also dispersion, with smaller concentrations of older Latinos found all across the region. Given our projections, over time there will be many more areas with relatively high numbers of Latinos aged 65 and older, which can then become a political issue. However, this has yet to become a topic of scholarly analysis.

There is a growing literature on the Latino population in the South, which has been concentrated primarily in Geography. It has tended to center largely on challenges related to newly established migrant communities. There is, for example, considerable discussion of whether Latinos are viewed primarily as "other" (Winders 2011) or if there also evidence that assimilation is taking place, particularly in rural areas (Marrow 2011). Either way, this population is now permanent and will



Fig. 3.3 Percent of population 65 + that is Hispanic by county, 2010 New South

continue growing, and as yet very little attention has been paid to the demographic implications.

Further, little is written about Latino politics in the South. Numerous general studies on the topic, however, provide clues about how politics will likely play out. For example, given the relatively high number of non-citizens, political influence is low, and even naturalization does not necessarily increase political participation because of the relatively low socio-economic status of Latinos (Levin 2013). Thus, even an increase of voters does not immediately translate into political influence, which we will examine below.

At the same time, certain issues do help spur political mobilization. This can include media coverage of the high social and national security costs of immigration. Merolla et al. (2013) note the future strain on social welfare programs in the United States as the Latino population in the U.S. ages, but in this chapter we examine the more specific question of the political, rather than policy, implications. That is, we know more much about the social aspects of Latino aging than we do about the political.

What these studies ignore, however, is aging. By 2040, the Hispanic population will no longer be "new." What will be the political implications? A recent study outlines the literature on the policy implications of Latino aging (Torres-Gil et al. 2013), noting that the rapid aging of the Hispanic population in the United States

as well as that of Mexico has started to generate fruitful research on policy options. Policy, though, is not synonymous with politics. The fact that certain policies might be optimal from a public health standpoint does not necessarily translate into the political support required to obtain the votes to make them pass.

One important issue for the future political influence of the Latino population relates to congressional districts. Historically, of course, the primary division in the South has been binary: black and white. When they draw districts each decade with the new Census, state legislatures have done their best within the constraints of the Voting Rights Act to use those two categories to separate white and black voters. Districts are political tools that in many cases practically guarantee that a candidate of one party or the other will win because the voters lean so overwhelmingly in one direction. Currently, the Latino population is relatively small and so much of the South has not experienced the development of more majority-minority districts at the federal level. These refer to districts that are comprised of populations that nationally are racial or ethnic minorities, but which in given districts comprise the majority. In turn, other districts—often a majority of districts in a given southern state—are majority-majority and are similarly impenetrable to the opposing party. However, some states, such as North Carolina, are seeing the development of such districts at the state and local levels (Peralta and Larkin 2011).

But in which districts will these changes occur? Our research on Charlotte, North Carolina shows that Latinos are moving to the suburbs and are not concentrated in enclaves (Weeks et al. 2007). A similar dynamic holds for Durham, NC (Flippan and Parrado 2012). This suburbanization is evident elsewhere in the South as well. Since the population is dispersed, it will hold a greater share even in districts that are currently predominantly white. What this means is that districts that currently are majority white will possibly become majority-minority. When combined with districts that are majority black, the implications are potentially quite large.

This is also true for state-level legislative districts, and even the local level. The suburbanization, combined with dispersion, means that politically drawn boundaries that were once predictably leaning toward one party or another because of racial composition will inevitably change. Irresistible forces have important political consequences.

According to the Pew Hispanic Center, in the 2012 presidential election Latinos voted for Barack Obama over Mitt Romney by a 71−27 % margin (Lopez and Taylor 2012). There is a dip for Latinos aged 65 and over, but even then Obama received 65 %. Meanwhile, about 93 % of African American voters chose Obama in 2012. Overall, these mirror support for the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. Combined, then, the two groups represent a solid Democratic force. There is no guarantee that the two would necessarily share commitment to the same interests—particularly as immigration reform is not high on the list of priorities for African American voters—but they would still be affecting the electoral foundation of the Republican Party.

In the long-term, then, the share of the white Republican vote will decrease, while the Democratic vote will increase because the total number of majority white districts in the South—which is the most Republican region of the country—will be



Fig. 3.4 Percentage of Latino citizens by age groups in North Carolina, 2010

on the decline. Some states that for years have been solidly red, like North Carolina, are already "purple," having gone for a Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential election for the first time since 1964, and then for Republicans in the 2012 election. As the number of Latinos in southern states grow, they will also lose their distinctively deep red label.

Across all groups, older citizens vote in greater numbers than younger. For example, according to the Census Bureau, in the in 2012 election the percentage of eligible adults who voted ranged from 41.2% for 18- to 24-year-olds, to a high of 71.9% for those 65 and older (File 2013).Therefore, we can expect that the voting share of the Latino population will increase as it ages, and that it will be voting predominantly for the Democratic Party.

At the same time, Latinos nationwide tend to vote less than whites or blacks. In the 2012 presidential election, a record 11.2 million Latinos voted but turnout was 48% of registered voters, which was actually a decrease from 49.9% in 2008 (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). In the case of North Carolina, as of 2013 Latinos constitute only 1.8% of all registered voters (http://www.app.sboe.state.nc.us/webapps/voter_stats/results.aspx?date=10–19-2013). The political changes that the region will experience are therefore much more relevant for 2040 than they are for the present day.

It is important to note that as a relatively new migrant destination, there is a sizeable undocumented population in the South. However, there is a large cohort of young Latinos that is not yet of voting age, but by 2040 will be adult. The cohort that in 2010 was aged 1–17 (that is, those are not yet of voting age) will in 2040 be between the ages of 31 and 47, and as citizens they will be voting. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of citizenship among age groups of Latinos in North Carolina. The proportion of undocumented immigrants will almost certainly decrease since we anticipate that the demographic fit between the US and Mexico, in particular, will have ended well before that date.

As the region experiences demographic shifts, political interests will shift as well. In particular, the needs of the older population will become more prominent.

At the moment, working age Latinos in the New South are not supporting a large number of aging parents. Since the New South has been a destination for only a bit more than a decade, their parents are still likely to be living back home, whether that be another state (generally western) or in another country. As yet, studies of Hispanic public opinion—already an underdeveloped area of study—have not examined aging at all (e.g. see Abrajano and Alvarez 2011). As more Latinos bear the costs associated with aging parents, the issue will become more salient.

Conclusions

In the South, as in much of the United States, the demographic train has left the station. For over a decade the region has been attractive to migrants leaving either a Latin American country or areas of the United States with weaker economies and/or higher costs of living. Our projections going out to 2040 show continued growth under virtually all assumptions, signaling a permanent shift in what had traditionally not been a destination for Hispanics. This demographic shift has important political repercussions, in large part because currently Latino voters overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party.

Further, even under assumptions of low future growth the size of the older Latino population will be significant. It is likely that the 2040 population will be something that falls within our high and low projections. The key point, however, is that either way it will grow substantially. As noted, there are many different public health policy implications, but politics will also change. The number of Latino voters, which at this point is still relatively low, will go steadily upward. Older voters go to the polls more frequently than younger, so older voters as well as their caregivers will gradually constitute a greater share of the electorate.

There are several strands of future research that merit greater attention. First, what is the relationship between voting behavior and age of parents? In particular, there is the question of whether caring for an older parent affects both propensity to vote and the likelihood of voting for a specific party. Second, what are the political dynamics between Latinos and African Americans in the New South? To what degree can they coordinate as minority-majority districts grow? The train has left the station, but it is not yet clear exactly where it is headed.

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