

Gender and Policy Agendas in the Post-War House

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Abstract

Women in Congress often work together to advance shared goals. I, therefore, expect female Representatives to work in tandem to advance women's rights when the conditions for collective action are favorable. Factors that affect these conditions include the size, composition, and relative power of the female delegation within the chamber. I hypothesize that female MCs will advance a distinct women's interest agenda when their delegation is homogeneous (with respect to party) *and* the women themselves are members of the majority party. Under such conditions, a unified female delegation will have the internal cohesion and external relationships (with the chamber leadership) needed to advance their agenda. I also expect the size of the women's delegation to influence the ease with which its members can overcome collective action problems. I hypothesize that women in Congress become *less* likely to craft a specialized women's agenda as the number of women in Congress increases and the interests of the group's members naturally diversify. I test these hypotheses using bill sponsorship data that spans from 1947 to 2006 and find support for them. Female Representatives are sensitive to the size and composition of their delegation, and adjust their policy priorities in response to these factors.

Keywords: Policy agendas, substantive representation, Congress, gender differences.

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Most empirical studies of gender differences in Congressional behavior rely on data from the past few decades. These studies have significantly advanced our understanding of the link between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, finding that women are more likely than men to sponsor, speak on the floor about, and vote for bills on “women’s issues” like childcare and gender discrimination (e.g. Dodson 2006; Gerrity, Osborn and Mendez 2007; MacDonald and O’Brien 2011; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Swers 1998, 2002a, 2002b).¹ However, the focus on recent Congressional sessions limits our ability to explore the impact of contextual political factors on these findings. For example, over the course of the post-war period, we have seen public attention to women’s rights wax and wane, the rise and fall of Democratic dominance in the House, a tenfold increase in the size of the female delegation, a dramatic rise in party polarization, and the ascendance of women to party and committee leadership positions. The degree to which women have pursued legislative agendas that are distinct from those of men under such varying conditions is the subject of this paper.

I argue that these dynamic factors shape the overall women’s agenda in profound and predictable ways. Because women in Congress often work together to advance shared goals (Minta and Brown 2014), factors that affect the size, cohesion, and relative strength of the female delegation will shape the agenda that female lawmakers collectively advance. I expect women in the House to be cognizant of the gender and party dynamics within the chamber and to adjust their behavior based on these factors. In particular, I hypothesize that female MCs will advance a distinct women’s interest agenda when their delegation is homogeneous (with regard to party membership) *and* the women themselves are members of the majority party. Under such conditions, a unified female delegation will have the internal cohesion and external relationships (with the chamber leadership) needed to advance a specialized agenda that focuses on issues like childcare, pay equity, women’s health, and gender discrimination.

I also expect the size of the women’s delegation to have an impact on the diversity of preferences and interests within the group—thereby influencing the ease with which its members can overcome collective action problems in the pursuit of common goals. I hypothesize that

¹Some scholars define women’s issues as those related the traditional role of women as caregivers, including education, general health care, and social welfare issues (e.g. Thomas 1994, Sapiro 1983). I refer to these as “traditional women’s issues.” Other scholars focus on policies that directly affect the wellbeing of women, such as gender discrimination, reproductive rights, parental leave, domestic violence, childcare, etc. I refer to these as “feminist policies.”

women in Congress will become *less* likely to craft a specialized women’s agenda as the number of women in Congress increases and the interests of the group’s members naturally diversify.

I test these hypotheses using bill sponsorship data that spans from 1947 to 2006. Rather than analyzing only “women’s issue” bills, as many past studies have done,² I utilize a dataset that contains a record of every bill sponsored during this period. Each of the bills has been assigned a policy topic and subtopic code based on its substantive focus that, together, cover the full range of issues considered by Congress. With these data, I explore the degree to which women in Congress have pursued a specialized policy agenda under a range of political conditions, and identify the topics on which women and men have been most and least active over time.

I find support for both of my main hypotheses and conclude that female MCs are sensitive to the size and composition of their delegation and the larger political climate, and adjust their priorities in response to these factors. In particular, the women’s agenda has diversified over time as the size of the female delegation has grown. Despite this recent diversification; however, female Representatives have continued to champion women’s rights while branching out into a range of additional policy topics.

In the section below, I first briefly review the literature on the link between the descriptive and substantive representation of women before outlining my theoretical expectations and hypotheses. The analysis section that follows is broken into two parts. The first examines the factors that influence the distinctiveness of the female agenda in Congress. The second examines the specific policy topics and subtopics on which women have been especially active over time.

Will Women Act for Women?

A number of factors influence the priorities that legislators pursue. Chief among these are electoral considerations (e.g. Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005). Whether male or female, legislators are active on issues that are important to their constituents, their political rivals, and the organized interests within their districts. Legislators also construct agendas that are aligned with their political party’s platform. Democrats, for instance, are historically more active on the issues of civil rights and domestic welfare state issues, while Republicans are more active on defense and taxation (Petrocik 1996).

Beyond electoral and party effects, members’ personal interests and backgrounds also shape

²But see Swers (2007) and Platt (2008) for notable exceptions.

their priorities (Hall 1996). Those who contend women will be more active than their male colleagues on issues related to gender argue that as marginalized members of society, women share a common bond that heightens their interest in helping other women (Mansbridge 1999). For this reason, many scholars believe that the descriptive representation of women leads to the substantive representation of women (e.g. Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995, 1998).

Findings from a number of qualitative studies support these expectations. For instance, Carroll (2002) conducted interviews with 82 female members of Congress, finding that “regardless of their party, ideology, race, ethnicity, tenure in office, or institutional position” female MCs expressed a commitment to representing women beyond the lines of their districts (56). She concludes that it is the norm for women in Congress to conceive of themselves as serving at-large, or as surrogates for women nationwide—sentiments that are echoed in the memoirs and biographies of women such as Frances Bolton (R-OH), Corine “Lindy” Boggs (D-LA), Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY), and many others (Women in Congress 2010). These women displayed personal commitments to the advancement of women’s issues while in office and were known to work with their female colleagues to achieve their goals. For instance, Representatives Boggs and Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) co-founded the bipartisan Congresswomen’s Caucus (now the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues) in 1977 to facilitate collaboration amongst women in the House. The caucus was instrumental in shepherding through Congress legislation like The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, The Women’s Business Ownership Act, The Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Violence Against Women Act.

Empirical studies also find that female legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to prioritize and support women’s issue bills (e.g. Gerrity et al. 2007; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Swers 1998, 2002a, 2002b). Studies conducted by MacDonald and O’Brien (2011), and Gerrity and her colleagues (2007) provide particularly strong evidence of this. These two studies use similar methodology and both find that female and male copartisans who successively represent the same Congressional districts prioritize different issues while in office. Women are more likely to sponsor women’s issue bills than are men who come from the same party and represent the same district.

The Generalizability of Recent Findings

Despite the strength of these findings, questions about their generalizability remain unanswered. Some scholars argue that women will be apt to pursue a women's rights agenda only under certain circumstances. In particular, advocates of the "critical mass theory" contend that women who serve in legislative bodies with very few female members will avoid championing women's interests (Kanter 1977). The theory anticipates that once women make up a non-trivial percentage of a legislative body (ranging from 15% to 30%), they will be more likely to form alliances with one another and to pursue a women's issue agenda. Several studies provide support for the theory, collectively demonstrating that as the composition of a legislature nears 15% women, female lawmakers become more likely to introduce, prioritize, and become active participants in debates regarding women's interest legislation (e.g. Grey 2002, MacDonald and O'Brien 2011, Saint-Germain 1989, Thomas 1991, 1994).

The most recent work in the women and politics subfield has emphasized a wider range of factors that interact with gender to shape legislator priorities. In particular, many scholars highlight the differences in the agendas of Democratic and Republican women, finding that female Democrats are generally more active on and supportive of feminist policy topics such as reproductive rights, gender discrimination, and parental leave policies than are Republican women (e.g. Bratton 2002; Grey 2006; Shogan 2002; Swers 2002a). Others highlight the differences between the agendas of white women and women of color (e.g. Barrett 1995; Bratton and Haynie 1999). Barrett (1995), for instance, finds that black women legislators are particularly apt to focus on the issues of education, health care, economic development, and employment as compared with either white women or black men.

Majority party status and the party leadership and committee positions held by women are also among the many factors that shape their behavior in office (Dodson 2006; Swers 2002a). For instance, Swers (2002a) finds that women in the majority party and women who chair subcommittees with jurisdiction over women's issues sponsor more women's issue legislation than do other women. Furthermore, such institutional factors influence the behavior of all MCs. For men and women, the resources legislators need to pursue their priorities in Congress are unequally distributed. Senior members, committee and subcommittee chairs, and party leaders hold greater power within the chamber, owing in part to their greater access to resources like staff, agenda control, and specialized information. With such resources at their disposal, a single MC devoted to the cause of women's rights can advance it—regardless of sex. This idea

is sometimes referred to as the “critical actor” theory (Childs and Krook 2009). Conversely, members without seniority and party leadership positions may be less able to shape the agenda on their own than are more powerful members. Freshmen legislators and those in the minority party, in particular, tend to be less active than are other members of Congress (e.g. Garand and Burke 2006; Schiller 1995).

Dynamic Factors Shaping the Female Agenda in Congress

Given the changes to many of these factors over time—including the rise and fall of Democratic dominance in the House, a tenfold increase in the size of the female delegation, vacillations in the salience of women’s rights, and the ascendance of women to party and committee leadership positions—it is unclear whether we should expect the findings from recent studies to generalize well across the entire post-war period. Do female MCs become more likely to advance a specialized “women’s agenda” as their numbers in the chamber grow? How have changing partisan dynamics impacted the priorities women pursue? Do women choose to work alone as “critical actors” more often as more ascend to leadership positions? These questions can only be answered by observing the behavior of women in Congress over a period of many years. I do just that and argue that as these factors change over time, the priorities female lawmakers pursue as a delegation also change. As strategic political actors, women in Congress will consider the size, cohesion and power of their delegation, the party dynamics within the chamber, and the public salience of women’s rights when formulating their policy agendas. In short, I expect female MCs to work in tandem to advance women’s rights when the conditions for collective action are favorable. In this section, I discuss my hypotheses regarding the impact each of these dynamic factors has on the distinctiveness of the women’s agenda.

Increasing Numbers of Women

I expect the degree of difference between the aggregate agendas of women and men in Congress to slowly diminish over time as the proportion of women in the House increases. The reasons for this hypothesis are twofold. First, the task of serving as a surrogate for women nationwide is a heavy burden when the number of women in a given legislature is very low. During periods in which just a handful of women served in the House, each of those women likely felt a responsibility to make women’s issues a significant portion of her overall legislative agenda.

As the number of women in a legislative body increases, however, the task of representing women's interests can be shared across the entire female delegation. With more women in the House, each individual female legislator can introduce fewer women's issue bills, and yet in the aggregate, women's issues will continue to be represented.³

This hypothesis is grounded in the aforementioned literature that finds women in Congress typically believe it is their responsibility to represent women nationwide, and in the ample literature on collective action and group size. Many studies find that as group size increases, individual contributions to the provision of collective goods decrease (e.g. Olson 1965; Andreoni 1988; Fries, Golding and Romano 1991; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984). This is true even when a mixture of altruism and private consumption motivates contributors. For example, Linda Goetze and her colleagues (1993) find that as the size of a community increases, per capita contributions to the Public Broadcasting Company decrease. In a smaller community, individuals who value PBS know they must each contribute more to keep it afloat. In larger communities, individuals can contribute less and achieve the same outcome—but the incentive to free-ride altogether (that is, to reduce contributions to zero) is mitigated by the altruistic desire to participate in the provision of a needed public good. In fact, Goetze et al. (1993) find that in the aggregate, *total* contributions grow as group size increases.

I expect to observe the same dynamic among women in Congress seeking to advance a women's issue agenda. Female MCs will remain dedicated to the advancement of women's interests as the size of their delegation grows, but will share the responsibility for introducing such legislation with a larger number of women—freeing them to pursue other issues of importance to their districts and themselves. For example, if each of the ten female Representatives in the 82nd Congress introduced 20 pieces of women's interest legislation, a total of 200 such bills would be introduced by women during that session. If the 60 female Representatives in 106th Congress each introduced just one quarter as many women's interest bills (that is, five each), collectively they would still introduce 300 such bills. In this scenario, as the number of women increases, the total number of women's interest bills sponsored also increases. Yet, as the responsibility of representing women's interests is shared across more women (and the number of women's issue bills each woman sponsors drops off), the aggregate female agenda becomes less focused on women's issues and less distinct from that of men.

Additionally, during the majority of the post-war period, women held less than 5% of House

³This idea is one that is also put forward by Bratton (2005).

seats. With just a handful of women in office, the aggregate agenda pursued by the women's delegation will be limited to the areas of expertise and interest of the incumbent women and the districts they represent. Thus, the smaller the female delegation, the less likely the collective female agenda is to mirror the areas of interest and expertise represented by more than 400 male members of the House. As the number of women in the legislature grows from just 7 in 1947 to 71 in 2005, so too will the number of issues of importance to the female delegation. The aggregate agenda pursued by women will naturally diversify to look more like that of men as the number of women within the legislature increases.

Committee Leadership

I expect a similar dynamic as more women ascend to the positions of committee and subcommittee chairperson. As women chair more and more committees and subcommittees across a wider and wider range of issues, they will become active on a wider range of policy topics.⁴ The female agenda should diversify to look more like that of men as the share of women holding such positions increases.

Party Dynamics

The collective agenda pursued by women in Congress should also be shaped by party dynamics—with the partisan composition of the female delegation, the partisan composition of the chamber, and the party leadership roles held by women all influencing the issues female lawmakers pursue. Because Democratic women are more likely to advance feminist policies related to reproductive rights and gender discrimination than are Republican women, I expect the agendas pursued by women and men to become increasingly distinct as the proportion of the female delegation comprised by Democrats increases. Such differences should be especially pronounced when Democrats comprise the female delegation and the chamber as a whole predominantly—as prior research finds women introduce more women's interest legislation when they are members of the majority party (see Swers 2002a, 38). Female Republicans should also be emboldened to pursue more women's interest legislation when in the majority party. Ultimately, when the female delegation is cohesive and most members enjoy majority-party status, the aggregate

⁴But note that causality runs in both directions here. Members with particular interests are often given committee assignments that are aligned with those interests.

women's agenda will be more distinct from that of men.

Female MCs may also be more likely to advance a women's interest agenda when they believe the party leadership will be amenable to it.⁵ As women advance to leadership roles within the parties—serving as Majority and Minority Leaders, Party Chairs, Whips, and Secretaries—female lawmakers may see the parties as more receptive to the advancement of women's interests. The female delegation also becomes more powerful as more of its members rise to party leadership positions and accrue the staff, decision-making, and informational benefits that come with those positions. With greater access to resources and less fear of reprisal from the party leadership for advancing a women's interest agenda, women should be more apt to do so. As a result, we should see an increase in the distinctiveness of the women's agenda as the share of the female delegation holding party leadership positions increases.

Party dynamics have also changed more broadly within Congress over the course of the post-war period. Rules changes consolidated the leadership's power over the agenda during the 1960's (Rohde 1991) and party polarization has increased dramatically since the 1970's (Poole and Rosenthal 1996). While these factors have had profound effects on policymaking in Congress, I do not expect them to affect women and men differently or to influence the likelihood that women will pursue a distinctive agenda. However, as described in the methods section below, I do control for the degree of polarization in the House.

Changing Male Priorities

The changing priorities of male legislators could also affect the degree of difference in the agendas of women and men. In particular, I expect male members of Congress to attend more closely to women's issues when those issues are especially salient to the public. Over the years studied, public attention to women's issues reached its height during the women's movement of the 1960's and 1970's. This "Second Wave" of feminism was marked by public concern with topics like gender discrimination, reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and domestic violence. Due to public demand for Congressional action on these topics, I expect to see women's and men's legislative agendas become more similar during the Second Wave as a function of increased male

⁵Party leaders have the power to reward or punish their members for (dis)loyalty with a variety of carrots and sticks, including appointment to and removal from preferred committee assignments (e.g. Maltzman 1995, 1997; Rhode 1991; 1994). For this reason, all members have an interest in keeping the party leadership happy—or at least in not defying their wishes.

attention to highly salient women’s rights issues.

Have The Agendas of Women and Men Become More Similar?

I use data from the Congressional Bills Project (CBP) spanning from 1947 to 2006 (the 80th through the 109th Congress) to assess the degree of difference between the policy agendas of women and men in the U.S. House of Representatives (Adler and Wilkerson 1947–2006). The dataset contains a record of every bill introduced in the House during this period, including the name of the sponsor, the gender of the sponsor, the committee to which the bill was referred, and the policy topic of the bill. The policy topics assigned to each bill correspond to the coding scheme developed and utilized by the Policy Agendas Project.⁶ That coding scheme consists of 19 major topic categories (such as macroeconomics, energy, social welfare, and agriculture) and 229 more narrow policy subtopics that fall within the 19 major topics (such as tax policy, coal, food assistance, and food safety). Together, the 19 major topics and 229 subtopics cover the full range of issues legislated in Congress.⁷

Using the bill sponsorship data from the CBP, I develop an indicator I call the Gender Difference Index (GDI). The equation used to calculate the GDI is given below:

$$GDI_c = \sum \left| \frac{Bills_{fic}}{Bills_{ftc}} - \frac{Bills_{mic}}{Bills_{mtc}} \right|$$

where c = congress, f = female, m = male, t = total, and i = individual policy topic. The idea behind the index is to examine how the bills introduced by women in a given Congress are distributed among each of the 19 major policy topics and to compare that distribution with the distribution of bills introduced by men in the same Congress.⁸ To achieve this, the

⁶Private bills that do not fall into the Agendas coding scheme were purged from the data analyzed here.

⁷For a detailed explanation of the Policy Agendas topic coding scheme, see the Project’s website: policyagendas.org. Note that the coding scheme was updated in 2014 with the addition of a 20th category—a stand-alone category for immigration policy. That update is not reflected in the analyses presented here.

⁸Values of the GDI correspond to Congressional sessions, rather than years, because the number of women in the House varies from Congress to Congress rather than from year to year.

number of bills introduced by women and men respectively in each Congress is first calculated. Then, the proportion of the total legislation introduced by women in a given Congress that falls into each of the 19 major policy topics is calculated. The same is done for men and then the absolute value of the difference between the two proportions is taken. For example, in the 100th Congress, the proportion of legislation introduced by women on the topic of health was 0.14 and the proportion introduced by men on the same topic was 0.08. The absolute value of the difference between the two is 0.06. Having taken the absolute value of the difference in proportions for each policy topic, those values are summed across the 19 major policy topics. That sum is the Gender Difference Index score for the given Congress. If women and men distribute their attention similarly across the 19 policy topics, the index score will be low (with a minimum possible value of zero). If women and men focus their attention on disparate sets of issues, the score will be high (with a maximum possible value of 2). The GDI has a mean of 0.38 with a standard deviation of 0.15. It ranges from a low of 0.19 (observed during the 109th Congress) to a high of 0.81 (observed during the 80th Congress).⁹

To test the effect of the contextual factors described above on the degree of difference between women's and men's legislative agendas, OLS regression is used to estimate values of the GDI.¹⁰ To test the hypothesis that an increase in the size of the female delegation decreases the difference between the agendas of women and men, the proportion of seats held by women is included in the model as an independent variable. Figure 1 shows the GDI for all years graphed against this proportion, which ranges from a low of 0.02 in 1947 to a high of 0.16 in 2006. The mean of the series is 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.04.

[Figure 1 about here]

Variables measuring the proportion of the female delegation that is Democratic, the proportion of the chamber that is Democratic, and an interaction term that multiplies the two are also included. These test the hypothesis that the degree of difference in the agendas of men and women is highest when the same party controls the female delegation and the chamber. A variable measuring the proportion of the female delegation holding party leadership positions

⁹A Dickey Fuller test for a unit root indicates the GDI is stationary. See Appendix A.

¹⁰Appendix B provides the results of a Durbin Watson test for the model estimated and provides a figure displaying the residual for the model. A Dickey Fuller test of the residuals is also provided. These tests indicate that autocorrelation is not present.

is also included. As this proportion increases, the degree of difference between the female and male agendas is expected to increase. A measure of the share of women serving as a committee or subcommittee chairperson is also included. As this share increases, the distinctiveness of the female agenda is expected to decrease.

Because of the heightened salience of women's issues during the Second Wave, a variable identifying this period is included. The variable is coded as one for each year spanning from 1963 through 1982 and is coded as zero for all other years.¹¹ The agendas of men and women are expected to be more similar during this period due to heightened attention to women's rights among male lawmakers.

In addition to the main independent variables described above, three additional variables are included based on the extant literature. First, freshmen legislators are typically less active as sponsors of legislation than are other members of Congress, and therefore, may contribute little to the aggregate female agenda. For this reason, we may see the differences between women's and men's agendas decrease as the proportion of the female delegation comprised by freshman increases. I include a measure of the share of the female delegation comprised by freshman for this reason. Next, because women of color, and black women in particular, have been shown to pursue a distinct set of policy priorities, we may see increased differences between the agendas of women and men as the share of the female delegation comprised by black women increases. For this reason, a variable measuring the proportion of the female delegation comprised by black women is included. Lastly, dubbed the "Year of the Woman," the 1992 elections swept an unprecedented number of new women into the House. In 1993, 24 newly elected women joined 24 returning female members of the House, bringing the share of seats held by women to 10% for the first time in the chamber's history. Scholars from the critical mass tradition might expect the women of the House to seize this historic moment and become emboldened to pursue a "women's interest agenda."¹² For this reason, I include a dummy variable that is coded as one for 1993 and every year thereafter. The variable is coded zero in all years prior to 1993.

Lastly, I model gender differences in legislator priorities with and without a control for the

¹¹There are not precise dates marking the beginning and end of the Second Wave. I use 1963 as the starting point because it is the year of *The Feminine Mystique's* publication, and 1982 as the end point because the deadline for ratification of the ERA passed in June of that year.

¹²But note that 15% is typically the lowest threshold considered a "critical mass" of women in a legislature.

degree of party polarization in the House. Because polarization has increased over time as the size of the female delegation has also increased, it is important to make sure the effects of polarization are not incorrectly ascribed to the size of the delegation through omitted variable bias. The House polarization measure is the difference in mean party DW-NOMINATE scores.¹³

Findings

The results of the models estimating values of the GDI are displayed in Table 1. Model A excludes the polarization variable, Model B includes it. Note that both models fit the data well—both explain 71% of the variance in the dependent variable—but that the inclusion of the polarization variable does not increase model fit. The coefficient on the polarization variable also fails the significance test. Further, the main findings described below are unaltered by the variable’s inclusion. For these reasons, I focus my discussion on Model A.¹⁴

Notice that the coefficient on the variable measuring the proportion of seats held by women is negative and statistically significant, as anticipated. For every percentage point increase in the proportion of women in the House, the difference between the aggregate male and female agendas decreases by roughly 5 percentage points.¹⁵ The effect of the size of the female delegation on the GDI is, therefore, both statistically and substantively significant. Holding other variables

¹³For details on the construction of this variable, see: Poole and Rosenthal 1997; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 1997; and Poole 2005. The data are available on the DW-NOMINATE website: voteview.com/dwnomin.htm

¹⁴Appendix C provides an additional robustness check for the main model. I use an error correction model to estimate values of the GDI. This model includes as covariates the first difference of each of the independent variables described above—meaning the trends in the polarization variable and the variable measuring the share of seats held by women are removed. Here, the polarization variables remain *insignificant*, and the cumulative effect of delegation size remains negative and statistically significant, as in the OLS models presented below. However; some of the findings related to partisan composition are washed out in the ECM due to high levels of multicollinearity. Further, the ECM’s R^2 is .97, and the Adjusted R^2 is .82—which raises concerns that the model overfits the data. For these reasons, I present a simple OLS regression below.

¹⁵Recall that the dependent variable is the sum of differences in proportions. Thus, units of the dependent variable are percentage points.

constant, as the size of the female delegation increases over time, the degree of difference in the agendas pursued by men and women shrinks.

Next, notice that the interaction term that multiplies the Democratic share of seats in the chamber times the Democratic share of seats in the female delegation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficients on the variables that comprise the interaction term are also statistically significant. To understand the substantive effect of this interaction term on the level of difference between the agendas of women and men, I have calculated predicted values of the GDI for different levels of the interaction term and its component parts (holding other variables at their mean or modal value). The results are displayed in Table 2. Here we see that when the proportion of seats held by Democrats is at its mean level (0.56), the degree of difference in the agendas of men and women is modest, regardless of the partisan composition of the female delegation. When the proportion of seats held by Democrats is at its highest level (0.68), however, the GDI increases dramatically as the female delegation becomes more Democratic—ranging from 0.04 when the female delegation is 40% Democratic to 0.62 when the female delegation is 87% Democratic. When the share of seats held by Democrats is very low (0.43), the trend reverses itself. Under these conditions, the fewer the Democratic women, the greater the difference between the agendas of women and men. Put differently, when Republicans control the chamber and comprise a majority of the female delegation, we see large differences in the agendas of women and men. As expected, women are more apt to pursue a specialized agenda when they are members of the majority party.

[Table 1 about here]

[Table 2 about here]

These findings are also born out in the raw data. The highest GDI scores are observed in the Congresses during which the chamber and the female delegation were both controlled by Republicans (the 80th and 83rd). Of the four next highest, three were observed in Congresses during which the chamber and the female delegation were both heavily comprised by Democrats (the 81st, 92nd and 96th). Of the six highest observations, only one does not fit the pattern—the value of the GDI is 0.58 during the 82nd Congress, during which the female delegation was 40% Democratic and the chamber was 54% Democratic. The lowest GDI scores are observed during sessions when Republicans controlled the chamber and Democrats control the female delegation (the 108th and 109th). There is also a very low observation of the GDI (0.24) during the 87th Congress. This observation does not fit the general pattern—here Democrats comprised roughly

60% of the chamber and the female delegation. In general, however, the interaction between the partisan composition of the chamber and the female delegation is a strong predictor of the distinctiveness of the female agenda.

Returning to Table 1, note that the coefficient on the variable measuring the proportion of the female delegation serving as a committee or subcommittee chairperson is negative and statistically significant. For every percentage point increase in the share of women serving as a (sub)committee chair, the gender difference in agendas decreases by 0.65 percentage points. As expected, the ascendance of women to committee leadership positions causes gender differences to shrink, likely due to the diversity of the committees to which women were assigned. As women chair more and more committees across a wider and wider range of issues, the female agenda diversifies to look more like that of men.

The coefficient on the variable indicating the Second Wave period is significant and the sign on the coefficient is negative, as expected. The magnitude of the coefficient is small, however—the GDI decreases by 0.14 percentage points during the Second Wave period. This finding provides weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that expects the agendas of women and men to become more similar when women’s rights are highly salient.

Finally, the coefficient on the variable measuring the proportion of the female delegation holding party leadership positions is positive and statistically significant at a level of 90% confidence. For every percentage point increase in the proportion of women holding party leadership positions, the difference between the aggregate male and female agendas decreases by 0.86 percentage points. This finding suggests that women pursue a more distinctive agenda when the female delegation includes a larger share of party leaders; however, the effect is not statistically significant when polarization is added to the model.

The remaining coefficients fail the significance test.¹⁶ Overall, the factors that best predict the degree of difference between the female and male agendas are the percentage of seats held by women and the interaction between the partisanship of the female delegation and the partisanship of the chamber.

¹⁶Note that the variable measuring the percentage of the female delegation that is black is highly correlated with the variable measuring the percentage of the delegation that is Democratic. The high degree of collinearity between the two variables makes it unlikely that the former will attain statistical significance.

Which Issues Differentiate Female and Male Agendas?

While the analysis provided in the previous section demonstrates that having higher numbers of women in Congress leads to smaller differences between the agendas pursued by female and male lawmakers, the analysis provides no insight into the particular ways in which the issue agendas of women and men have differed over time. To test the hypothesis that female MCs have been more active than their male colleagues on women's issues—but that the feminization of these issues has decreased over time as the number of seats held by women has increased—further analysis is required. In this section, I explore the degree to which each of the 19 major topics and 229 subtopics have been feminized during four key historical periods.

Measuring Policy Feminization

I developed the *Policy Feminization Score*, or PFS, to measure relative levels of female and male sponsorship for each of the 19 major topics and 229 subtopics. Values of the PFS correspond to four key historical periods. The beginning and end of the Second Wave period and the Year of the Woman provide natural cut points for the division of the data. The number of women in Congress was flat prior to the Second Wave period and the salience of women's rights was also relatively low during the earliest years of the study, making the years from 1947 to 1962 a distinct historical period. In contrast, during the Second Wave period (1963-1982), women's rights were highly salient and the number of women in Congress began to rise steadily starting in 1970. This period is the second period examined. By 1983, the momentum of the Second Wave had stalled. The ratification deadline for the ERA had passed without the Amendment's enactment and the Reagan administration marked a shift in national attention to "family values." Nevertheless, the number of women in Congress climbed steadily during this third historical period, which spans from 1983 to 1992. Lastly, the number of women in the House doubled in 1993 and has continued to increase sharply since that time. The period from 1993 to 2006 is the last historical period examined.

The formula for the construction of the PFS is given below:

$$PFS_{ip} = \frac{\left(\frac{Bills_{fip}}{Bills_{tip}} \right)}{\left(\frac{Bills_{fp}}{Bills_{tp}} \right)}$$

where f = female, t = total, i = individual policy topic, and p = period. The score is calculated by first determining, for each period, the proportion of all legislation sponsored by women. This number is a baseline that represents the overall level of female sponsorship activity in each period and it is the denominator in the equation above. The next step in the construction of the PFS is, for each period, to calculate the proportion of legislation sponsored by women in each of the major topic and subtopic areas. That proportion is then divided by the baseline to render a score for the given topic or subtopic in the given period. For example, the PFS for health during the pre-Second Wave period is the proportion of health legislation sponsored by women between 1947 and 1962 divided by the baseline proportion of all legislation sponsored by women during those same years.

Constructing the measure this way adjusts the topic-specific level of female sponsorship for the overall activity level of women in the relevant period. It also adjusts for period-to-period differences in the total number of bills sponsored. If the score is greater than one, this indicates women are more active in that policy area than they are on average across all policy areas in the given period. Conversely, a score of less than one indicates women are less active in the policy area than they are on average across all policy areas in the given period.

Note that the PFS is also relative to the activity level of men within a given topic or subtopic. This is because one minus the numerator is the proportion of legislation on a given topic introduced by men. If the proportion of legislation introduced by women on a given topic is large, the proportion introduced by men must be small, and vice versa. Further, one minus the denominator is the baseline proportion of legislation introduced by men in a given period. For this reason high values on the PFS can be interpreted both as high levels of female activity and low levels of male activity. Conversely, low values on the PFS can be interpreted both as low levels of female activity and high levels of male activity. When women and men introduce legislation in a given topic area in an amount equal to the overall proportion of legislation they respectively generated in a given period, the PFS will equal one.

Major Topic Policy Feminization Scores

The Policy Feminization Scores for the major policy topics are displayed by period in Table 3. Topics with scores that are at least one standard deviation above or below the mean are shaded in gray. Notice that during the first three periods, the topic of civil rights and liberties is the most highly feminized. Further, the PFS for the topic of civil rights is at least one standard deviation above the mean in all four periods, with the highest score for the topic observed during the Second Wave. Women have, therefore, been disproportionately active on the topic of civil rights and liberties throughout the entire post-war period. However, this heightened level of attention is due primarily to the efforts of Democratic women. Figure 2 shows the PFS scores calculated separately for Democratic and Republican women. Republican women were highly active on the issue of Civil Rights during the Second Wave period, when public support for such policies reached its peak, but not during the other three periods studied. Based on this evidence, it seems Republican women will champion feminist policies when the public demands them, but are less likely to do so under other circumstances.

[Table 3 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

Returning to Table 3, we see that women have also been highly active on the traditional women's issue of health. The PFS for health exceeds the mean plus one standard deviation in all periods except the Second Wave period and health is the most highly feminized topic during the period spanning from 1993 to 2006. Further, the topic has been prioritized by both Democratic and Republican women (see Figure 2), making it an area fertile for bipartisan collaboration between female members of Congress.

Two additional traditional women's issues—social welfare, and community development and housing—are also among the most consistently feminized. The PFS for social welfare is greater than the mean plus one standard deviation during the Second Wave period and the period immediately following the Second Wave. Further, the topic has a PFS that is greater than one during each of the four historical periods. Community development and housing is among the most highly feminized during the period spanning from 1947 to 1962. It remains near or above one during each subsequent period.

Somewhat surprisingly, the masculine topic of defense is highly feminized during the earliest period. The feminization of this topic is due primarily to the efforts of one woman—Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA). Rogers served on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs throughout her

Congressional career (1925 to 1960) and chaired the committee during the 80th (1947-1949) and 83rd Congresses (1953-1955) (Women in Congress 2010). Rogers sponsored 357 (66%) of the 541 defense bills introduced by women between 1947 and 1962. Further, just over 72% of the defense bills introduced by women were on the subtopic of veteran's issues. The second most active female legislator on the topic of defense was Maude Elizabeth Key (D-WV), who sponsored 35 defense bills during the same time period.

Since Rogers, no woman has chaired a House standing committee with jurisdiction over defense-related topics and since the start of the Second Wave, defense has primarily been a male dominated issue area. During the period spanning from 1983 through 1992, however, the topic experienced a second (less pronounced) period of feminization. Women introduced 137 bills on the topic of defense during these years, and defense was the fourth most feminized during the period (with a PFS of 1.22). The women who sponsored the most defense related legislation during the period—Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) and Beverly Butcher Byron (D-MD)—both chaired subcommittees with jurisdiction over defense-related topics. Schroeder chaired the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities from 1989 to 1993. Byron chaired the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation from 1987 to 1993. Together, these two women sponsored just over 30% of the defense-related legislation introduced by women during the period. Barbara Boxer, who served as a member of the Armed Services Committee from 1987-1989 and again from 1991-1993, was also a prolific sponsor of defense-related legislation. She introduced just over 15% of the defense bills sponsored by women during this period.

This example illustrates that the committee assignments of women are relevant to their levels of activity on particular policy topics—positioning some to become “critical actors” on specific issues.¹⁷ It also illustrates that a single woman is much less able to influence the feminization of a policy topic later in the series (when the number of women in the House is higher) than earlier in the series. This is both a mathematical reality and a fundamental tenet of collective action—the contributions of single members are less influential in larger groups than in smaller

¹⁷Schroeder, for instance, believed her involvement in defense policy furthered women's interests. She has been quoted saying, “When men talk about defense, they always claim to be protecting women and children, but they never ask the women and children what they think” (Moritz 1978).

ones. However, these realities should not stop us from investigating the policy agendas crafted by women during the 1940s, '50s, and '60s. Because the dataset employed here contains a record of every bill introduced by every member of the House from 1947 to 2006, it represents the entire population of bills during this period rather than a mere sample. Thus, we need not extrapolate from these findings to arrive at meaningful conclusions. Instead, the data paint a detailed portrait of the priorities pursued by women in Congress under a range of historical conditions—including periods during which they were woefully underrepresented.

Overall, the most consistently feminized topics include the feminist topic of civil rights and three of four traditional women's topics: health, social welfare, and community development and housing. Of the traditional women's topics, only education fails to attain a PFS that is at least one standard deviation above the mean (although it consistently has a PFS above one).

The most highly and consistently *masculinized* topics are macroeconomics; space, science and technology; and agriculture. Note that these three topic areas correspond to typically male-dominated professions. The historical under-representation of women in the fields of economics, technology, and agriculture may have contributed to the low levels of female sponsorship activity in these areas.

Subtopic Feminization

The calculation of Policy Feminization Scores for the 229 policy subtopics allows for a more detailed look at gender differences in legislator agendas. Table 4 provides summary statistics of the subtopic scores for the four historical periods and Figure 3 shows the distribution of subtopic scores calculated for each session of Congress.¹⁸ Together, these two summaries clearly illustrate a gradual metamorphosis of the female agenda in Congress as it becomes more diverse and less distinct from that of men over time.

[Table 4 about here]

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure Three shows that from the late 1940s through the early 1970s, extreme outliers were not uncommon—in fact some subtopics were so highly feminized that they attained scores

¹⁸These scores are calculated using the formula given on page 16, where “period” has been replaced with “session.” Appendix D provides tables that list each of the subtopics with scores that are at least one standard deviation above or below the mean in each of the four periods.

near 40 during single Congressional sessions. However, many other subtopics had no female sponsorship activity whatsoever during these years. Table Four shows that during the pre-Second Wave period, 58 subtopics (nearly 25% of all the subtopics) had scores of zero. Among these are numerous subtopics on which male legislators introduced at least 20 bills, including: general government operations, military aid and weapons sales, sports and gambling regulation, NASA, international resources exploitation, and direct war related issues. The high number of subtopics with no female-sponsored bills demonstrates the inability of such a small delegation to become active on the full array of issues legislated in Congress. Instead, the members of the female delegation (which held 3% of the seats during the period on average) focused their attention on a few key topics. In particular, they sponsored 47 bills on the topic of gender discrimination—roughly 42% of all the bills introduced on the issue. This results in a PFS of 12.15, which is three standard deviations above the mean. The topic of food assistance also has a large PFS during the first period—5.82—which is nearly one and a half standard deviations above the mean.

These findings provide evidence that women in Congress did not shy away from championing women's interests during periods when their numbers were low. In contrast to the expectations of the critical mass theory, female lawmakers championed women's interests when their share of seats was well below the 15% threshold, and they continued to do so during the Second Wave period. During this era known for the salience of women's rights, the subtopic of gender and sexual orientation discrimination is the most highly feminized subtopic, with a PFS of 11.43—a score that is *eight* standard deviations above the mean. Not only were women very active on the topic during this period, the high PFS indicates that women's attention to the topic far exceeded male attention when overall levels of sponsorship for the two groups are accounted for. Women sponsored roughly 38% of the bills on gender discrimination despite holding approximately 4% of the seats in the chamber. Women were also highly active on a number of topics related to international affairs and aid, and the feminist topics of parental leave and childcare, family issues, and general civil rights (a category that includes legislation aimed at preventing discrimination against more than one group, such as women and minorities). A number of traditional women's interest topics were also highly feminized: housing assistance, infant and child health, child abuse, mental health and retardation, and "other" community development and housing issues (a category for miscellaneous legislation on the topic of development and housing).

Overall, the female agenda during the Second Wave period demonstrates that women in the House were apt to pursue a specialized agenda—in that it focused heavily on a mixture of feminist and traditional women’s issues—despite their “token” status within the body. We also see the female agenda beginning to diversify during this period. The number of subtopics with no female sponsorship drops almost in half, from 58 to 25, and the number of subtopics with scores that are at least one standard deviation above the mean doubles (from 8 to 16).

This trend in diversification continues throughout the final two periods, during which we see fewer extreme outliers, fewer topics with zero female sponsorship, *more* topics on which women are highly active as compared with men, and a decrease in the standard deviation. During the most recent period (1993-2006), a number of traditional women’s issues and feminist issues are among the most feminized—including parental leave and childcare, gender discrimination, infant and child health, disease prevention, and several others—as are a variety of additional subtopics. These includes (but is not limited to) direct war related issues, transportation research and development, international scientific cooperation, recycling, and U.S. dependencies and territories. These findings support those of the regression analysis, indicating that the women’s agenda has diversified as the number of women in the House has increased. Yet even as the female members of Congress have expanded their agenda to include a range of non-women’s issues, they have continued to serve as surrogates for women nationwide.

Summary and Conclusion

Changing institutional and contextual factors have shaped the aggregate female agenda in important ways over the course of the post-war period. In particular, changing party dynamics have had a profound impact on the degree of difference between the agendas of women and men. Women are more apt to pursue a distinct legislative agenda when the female delegation and the chamber as a whole are both heavily comprised by the same party. This is true for both Democratic and Republican women. When the female delegation is cohesive and most of its members enjoy majority party status, women in Congress pursue a distinct agenda. Women may also pursue a more specialized agenda when the female delegation includes more party leaders. These findings suggest that women are cognizant of the composition and relative strength of the female delegation within the institution and adjust their agendas based on these factors.

The agendas of women and men become *less* distinct as the number of women in Congress

increases. This decrease in difference reflects the ease with which a larger female delegation can become active on a wider range of issues. Yet, even as women in Congress have branched out into a wider array of policy domains, they have continued their commitment to the topics of civil rights, health care, gender equality, parental leave, childcare, and family issues. Not only are these topics consistently feminized throughout the post-war period, the raw number of bills introduced on these topics has increased as the number of women in Congress has grown. For instance, over the course of the last two historical periods analyzed—during which the average number of seats held by women more than doubled—the number of bills introduced by women on the feminist topics of gender discrimination, parental leave and childcare, and family issues respectively grew from 16 to 37, 36 to 72, and 37 to 119. As expected, women appear to share the responsibility of advocating for women’s issues across the female delegation. As a result, the raw number of women’s interest bills increases as the number of women in Congress grows, even as the overall agendas of women and men become more similar.

Male attention to these feminist topics has not kept pace with female attention over time. As illustrated by Figure 4, the percentage of the male agenda devoted to these topics has historically fallen well below that of women. In the cases of gender discrimination and parental leave, male sponsorship levels have been flat. In the case of family issues, male sponsorship levels have increased over time, but by far less than female sponsorship levels. While this is not an exhaustive test of changes in male priorities, I find no evidence that increased male attention to feminist issues lead to a decrease in the degree of difference between the agendas of women and men. Instead, I find many reasons to believe these changes were driven by the diversification of the female agenda.

[Figure 4 about here]

This diversification is also evidenced by the steady increase in the number of feminized policy topics over the course of the post-war period. During the Pre-Second Wave period, women were highly active on just eight policy subtopics, as compared with 26 in the period spanning from 1993 to 2006. Similarly, the number of policy topics on which women are not active has decreased dramatically over time.

Overall, the findings outlined here largely comport with the extant literature showing that female legislators emphasize women’s issues more frequently than do their male colleagues. This paper shows that female members of Congress have championed both feminist and traditional women’s issues throughout the post-war period. In contrast to the expectations of the critical

mass theory; however, women did not avoid association with women's issues even when they were dramatically underrepresented in the House. I find evidence suggesting women have sought opportunities to work with one another for the advancement of women's rights throughout the post-war period and have adjusted their degree of focus on women's issues as the size and composition of the female delegation has changed over time. Thus, the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women is one that cannot be fully understood without an examination of the aggregate female agenda and the dynamic factors that shape it.

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Tables

Table 1: Degree of Gender Difference in Legislative Agendas (1947-2006)

Variable	Model A	Model B
Proportion of Seats Held By Women	-5.19** (1.54)	-7.99** (3.06)
Proportion of Chamber Democratic	-6.79** (1.82)	-6.98** (1.82)
Proportion of Women Democratic	-5.68** (1.70)	-5.89** (1.70)
Chamber Partisanship X Women's Partisanship	10.19** (3.03)	10.56** (3.04)
Proportion of Women Who Are Party Leaders	0.86* (0.45)	0.64 (0.50)
Proportion of Women Who Are Sub/Committee Chairs	-0.65** (0.29)	-0.59* (0.30)
Proportion of Women Who Are Black	0.52 (0.40)	0.43 (0.40)
Proportion of Women Who Are Freshmen	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.19)
Second Wave	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
10% Threshold	0.19 (0.13)	0.25* (0.14)
Polarization	.	0.65 (0.61)
Intercept	4.57** (0.96)	4.46** (0.96)
N	30	30
Adjusted R^2	0.71	0.71

** Indicates $p < .05$; * Indicates $p < .10$

Table 2: Predicted Values of the GDI

	Proportion of Chamber Democratic			
		<i>Min</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Max</i>
Proportion Women Democratic	<i>Min</i>	0.71	0.36	0.04
	<i>Mean</i>	0.42	0.36	0.31
	<i>Max</i>	0.09	0.37	0.62

Predicted values are based on Model A.

Table 3: Most to least feminized policy topics, by period

	1947-1962		1963-1982		1983-1992		1993-2006	
<i>Major Topic</i>	<i>PFS</i>	<i>Major Topic</i>	<i>PFS</i>	<i>Major Topic</i>	<i>PFS</i>	<i>Major Topic</i>	<i>PFS</i>	<i>Major Topic</i>
Civil Rights	1.99	Civil Rights	2.21	Civil Rights	1.80	Health	1.42	
Defense	1.80	Social Welfare	1.58	Health	1.67	Civil Rights	1.38	
Health	1.55	Development, Housing	1.37	Social Welfare	1.35	Law, Crime, Family	1.17	
Development, Housing	1.47	Health	1.33	Defense	1.22	Development, Housing	1.17	
Education	1.15	Education	1.30	Government Ops	1.14	Labor	1.16	
Social Welfare	1.14	Intern'l Affairs, Aid	1.17	Labor	1.12	Social Welfare	1.14	
Agriculture	1.00	Labor	1.13	Transportation	1.06	Education	1.12	
Labor	0.98	Government Ops	1.03	Law, Crime, Family	1.04	Defense	1.05	
Government Ops	0.94	Transportation	0.95	Development, Housing	1.02	Intern'l Affairs, Aid	0.99	
Public Land	0.78	Law, Crime, Family	0.92	Environment	0.92	Government Ops	0.94	
Environment	0.67	Banking, Finance	0.84	Education	0.83	Banking, Finance	0.93	
Foreign Trade	0.64	Macroeconomics	0.83	Public Land	0.80	Agriculture	0.92	
Intern'l Affairs, Aid	0.61	Public Land	0.78	Foreign Trade	0.76	Space, Science, Tech	0.84	
Law, Crime, Family	0.59	Energy	0.74	Macroeconomics	0.72	Foreign Trade	0.83	
Energy	0.59	Defense	0.71	Banking, Finance	0.67	Transportation	0.81	
Space, Science, Tech	0.53	Environment	0.67	Energy	0.66	Energy	0.80	
Transportation	0.50	Foreign Trade	0.64	Intern'l Affairs, Aid	0.65	Public Land	0.78	
Banking, Finance	0.50	Agriculture	0.56	Space, Science, Tech	0.52	Environment	0.75	
Macroeconomics	0.46	Space, Science, Tech	0.34	Agriculture	0.50	Macroeconomics	0.60	
Mean PFS	0.94	Mean PFS	1.01	Mean PFS	0.97	Mean PFS	0.99	
Std. Dv.	0.47	Std. Dv.	0.43	Std. Dv.	0.36	Std. Dv.	0.22	

Topics in gray have scores that are at least one standard deviation above or below the mean.

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Subtopic PFS

Statistic	Period			
	<i>1947-1962</i>	<i>1963-1982</i>	<i>1983-1992</i>	<i>1993-2006</i>
Mean	1.29	1.10	1.00	1.04
Standard Deviation	3.21	1.25	1.02	0.60
Range	0-29.21	0-11.43	0-7.56	0-4.06
Number of Scores > Mean + 1 Std. Dv.	8	16	22	26
Number of Subtopics with No Female Sponsorship	58	25	32	8
Average Share of Seats Held by Women	3%	4%	6%	13%

Figures




Figure 1: Gender Difference Index, 1947-2006







Figure 2: Partisan Differences in Policy Feminization




Figure 3: Distribution of Annual Subtopic Policy Feminization Scores




Figure 4: Male and Female Activity on Feminist Policy Topics

Appendix A

Table 1: GDI Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

	Test Statistic	1% Critical Value	5% Critical Value	10% Critical Value
Z(t)	-4.07	-3.72	-2.99	-2.63

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.001

N=29

Appendix B: Tests for Autocorrelation

Durbin-Watson D-statistic (11, 30) = 2.490

Critical $D_L=0.712$

Critical $D_U=2.363$

Table 2: Residuals: Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

	Test Statistic	1% Critical Value	5% Critical Value	10% Critical Value
Z(t)	-6.71	-3.72	-2.99	-2.63

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.000

N=29




Figure 1: Residuals From Main Model

Appendix C

Table 3: Error Correction Model Estimating Values of the GDI

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
L.GDI	-1.68**	0.28
L.Proportion of Seats Held By Women	-13.28**	4.95
D.Proportion of Seats Held By Women	1.47	4.98
L.Proportion of Chamber Democratic	6.65	4.24
D.Proportion of Chamber Democratic	3.05	3.47
L.Proportion of Women Democratic	6.58	3.80
D.Proportion of Women Democratic	3.89	3.19
L.Chamber Partisanship X Women's Partisanship	-11.54	6.79
D.Chamber Partisanship X Women's Partisanship	-5.47	5.45
L.Proportion of Women Who Are Party Leaders	1.09	1.14
D.Proportion of Women Who Are Party Leaders	1.67**	0.79
L.Proportion of Women Who Are Sub/Committee Chairs	-3.19**	0.80
D.Proportion of Women Who Are Sub/Committee Chairs	-1.46**	0.50
L.Proportion of Women Who Are Black	2.21**	0.71
D.Proportion of Women Who Are Black	1.27**	0.51
L.Proportion of Women Who Are Freshmen	-0.98**	0.30
D.Proportion of Women Who Are Freshmen	-0.48**	0.24
L.Second Wave	-0.06	0.09
D.Second Wave	0.07	0.09
L.10% Threshold	0.28	0.23
D.10% Threshold	-0.02	0.20
L.Polarization	-0.47	0.67
D.Polarization	0.72	0.52
Intercept	-1.53**	0.52

Adjusted R²=0.82

N=29

** Indicates $p < .05$

Appendix D: Most and Least Highly Feminized Policy Subtopics

Table 4: Most and Least Highly Feminized Policy Subtopics Prior to Second Wave (1947-1962)

Subtopic	PFS	% of Bills Sponsored By Women	Total N
Housing Assistance and Homelessness	29.21	100.00	1
International Affairs, Africa	29.21	100.00	1
Hazardous Waste	14.60	50.00	2
Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination	12.15	41.59	113
International Affairs, Other	7.79	26.67	15
Environment R and D	7.30	25.00	4
Food Assistance	5.84	20.00	100
Health Insurance Regulation	5.48	18.75	16
Age Discrimination	0	0	56
Right To Privacy	0	0	25
Comprehensive Health Reform	0	0	42
Medical Liability and Fraud	0	0	6
Prescription Drug Coverage	0	0	5
Tobacco Abuse	0	0	32
Alcohol Abuse	0	0	26
Drug Abuse Education	0	0	49
Drug and Alcohol Treatment	0	0	5
Health, Other	0	0	8
Education of Underprivileged Students	0	0	1
Vocational Education	0	0	57
Special Education	0	0	73
Education R and D	0	0	3
Education, Other	0	0	16
Environment, General	0	0	36
Air Pollution, Global Warming	0	0	39
Pollution and Conservation in Coastal Waterways	0	0	60
Alternative and Renewable Energy	0	0	15
Energy Conservation	0	0	1
Energy, Other	0	0	3
Riots and Crime Prevention	0	0	20
Law, Crime, Family, Other	0	0	6
Rural Economic Development	0	0	9
Development and Housing, Other	0	0	4
Insurance Regulation	0	0	51
Tourism	0	0	29
Sports and Gambling Regulation	0	0	113
Banking and Finance, Other	0	0	32
U.S. and Other Defense Alliances	0	0	36
Military Aid and Weapons Sales	0	0	140
Military Nuclear and Hazardous Waste	0	0	7
Direct War Related Issues	0	0	75
Defense R and D	0	0	19
Space, Science and Technology, General	0	0	50
NASA	0	0	79
Commercial Use of Space	0	0	10
International Scientific Cooperation	0	0	1
Weather Forecasting	0	0	40
Space, Science and Technology R and D	0	0	47
Export Promotion and Regulation	0	0	68
International Private Business Investments	0	0	9
Exchange Rates	0	0	6
International Resources Exploitation	0	0	76
International Affairs, Developing Countries	0	0	1
International Affairs, China	0	0	7
International Affairs, Soviet Union	0	0	7
International Affairs, Eastern Europe	0	0	8
International Affairs, Western Europe	0	0	15
International Affairs, Latin America	0	0	32
International Affairs, Asia	0	0	21
International Affairs, Middle East	0	0	2
International Human Rights	0	0	10
Government Operations, General	0	0	192
Nominations and Appointments	0	0	30
IRS Administration	0	0	7
Census	0	0	64
Public Land and Water, Other	0	0	1

The mean subtopic score during this period is 1.29 with a standard deviation of 3.21

Table 5: Most and Least Highly Feminized Policy Subtopics, Second Wave Period (1963-1982)

Subtopic	PFS	% of Bills Sponsored By Women	Total N
Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination	11.43	38.12	223
International Affairs, Eastern Europe	7.89	26.32	19
Foreign Trade, Other	7.50	25.00	4
Infant and Child Health	5.07	16.91	136
International Affairs, South Africa	5.00	16.67	6
Housing Assistance, Homelessness	4.61	15.38	13
Parental Leave and Child Care	3.40	11.32	159
Defense Research and Development	3.00	10.00	20
International Affairs, Asia	2.73	9.09	88
Civil Rights, General	2.70	9.01	533
Bankruptcy	2.53	8.45	142
DOD Civilian Personnel	2.53	8.45	71
Child Abuse	2.52	8.41	107
Mental Health and Mental Retardation	2.50	8.33	216
Family Issues	2.41	8.04	510
Development and Housing, Other	2.40	8.02	212
Civil Rights, Other	0	0	4
Drug and Alcohol Treatment	0	0	33
Health, Other	0	0	57
Agriculture, Other	0	0	64
Labor, Other	0	0	17
Education R and D	0	0	8
Waste Disposal	0	0	317
Environment R and D	0	0	66
Transportation R and D	0	0	27
Transportation, Other	0	0	28
Law, Crime, Family, Other	0	0	31
Social Welfare, Other	0	0	8
Rural Housing	0	0	196
Rural Economic Development	0	0	228
U.S. And Other Defense Allies	0	0	29
Commercial Use of Space	0	0	16
International Scientific Cooperation	0	0	8
Computer Industry and Internet Issues	0	0	3
Space, Science and Tech R and D	0	0	221
Exchange Rate	0	0	33
International Affairs, China	0	0	7
Soviet Union	0	0	61
International Affairs, Africa	0	0	11
International Affairs, Latin America	0	0	62
Public Land and Water, Other	0	0	15

The mean subtopic score during this period is 1.10 with a standard deviation of 1.25

Table 6: Most and Least Highly Feminized Policy Subtopics, 1983-1992

Subtopic	PFS	% of Bills Sponsored By Women	Total N
Transportation, Other	7.56	50.00	2
Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination	5.90	39.02	41
Alcohol Abuse and Treatment	4.32	28.57	14
Parental Leave and Child Care	4.22	27.91	129
Disease Prevention	4.17	27.59	116
Law, Crime and Family, Other	3.78	25.00	4
Other or Multiple Benefits and Procedures	3.32	21.97	132
Health Research and Development	3.27	21.60	125
Infant and Child Health	3.17	20.96	167
Energy Research and Development	3.03	20.00	25
DOD Civilian Personnel	2.98	19.70	66
Family Issues	2.84	18.78	197
Federal Holidays	2.81	18.60	43
Civil Defense and Homeland Security	2.75	18.18	11
Race Discrimination	2.67	17.65	51
Riots and Crime Prevention	2.66	17.57	74
Elderly and Handicap Housing	2.65	17.50	40
Government Employee Benefits	2.58	17.03	640
Voting Rights	2.52	16.67	24
Military Procurement	2.48	16.42	67
Government Operations, Other	2.39	15.79	95
Government Procurement	2.24	14.78	115
Unemployment Rate	0	0	4
Price Control and Stabilization	0	0	1
Anti-government activities	0	0	8
Civil Rights, Other	0	0	5
Prescription Drug Coverage	0	0	33
Special Education	0	0	14
Education R and D	0	0	9
Coal	0	0	33
Energy, Other	0	0	1
Transportation R and D	0	0	11
Law, Crime and Family, General	0	0	42
White Collar Crime	0	0	40
Juvenile Crime and Justice	0	0	27
Law, Crime, Family, Other	0	0	9
Health, Other	0	0	3
Tourism	0	0	9
NASA	0	0	70
Computer Industry, Internet Issues	0	0	28
Space, Science, Tech R and D	0	0	56
Space, Science, Tech, Other	0	0	22
Exchange Rate	0	0	7
Foreign Trade, Other	0	0	5
International Affairs, General	0	0	52
International Affairs, Eastern Europe	0	0	23
International Affairs, Africa	0	0	20
International Affairs, South Africa	0	0	15
Panama Canal	0	0	39
International Affairs, Asia	0	0	14
International Human Rights	0	0	31
International Affairs, Other	0	0	6
Relief of Claims Against the U.S. Government	0	0	47
International Affairs, Other	0	0	7

The mean subtopic score during this period is 1.00 with a standard deviation of 1.02

Table 7: Most and Least Highly Feminized Policy Subtopics, Post “Year of the Woman” (1993-2006)

Subtopic	PFS	% of Bills Sponsored By Women	Total N
Handicap or Disease Discrimination	4.06	62.50	16
Parental Leave and Child Care	3.55	54.55	132
Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination	3.16	48.68	76
Transportation R and D	2.71	41.67	12
Infant and Child Health	2.48	38.20	267
Prevention of Communicable Diseases	2.43	37.39	238
District of Columbia Affairs	2.38	36.64	131
Developing Countries Issues	2.31	35.56	45
Census	2.31	35.48	62
International Scientific Cooperation	2.17	33.33	6
Family Issues	2.14	32.96	361
Health R and D	2.08	31.96	291
Recycling	1.97	30.23	43
Child Abuse	1.94	29.88	164
US Dependencies and Territories	1.92	29.58	71
Low and Middle Income Housing	1.86	28.57	154
Education of Underprivileged Students	1.84	28.24	85
Space, Science, Tech R and D	1.83	28.17	71
Public Works	1.80	27.66	47
Juvenile Crime and Justice	1.79	27.54	69
Tourism	1.77	27.27	22
Direct War Related Issues	1.75	26.92	26
Civil Rights, General	1.72	26.47	34
Mental Health and Mental Retardation	1.71	26.32	57
Veterans and Military Housing	1.71	26.32	57
Law, Crime, Family, Other	1.70	26.09	23
Foreign Trade, General	0.43	6.67	90
Weather Forecasting	0.38	5.88	51
Court Administration	0.35	5.45	275
Securities and Commodities Regulation	0.33	5.09	216
Copyrights and Patents	0.33	5.08	177
Western Europe	0.32	5.00	20
Agriculture, Other	0.30	4.65	43
Electricity and Hydroelectricity	0.30	4.55	220
Exchange Rates	0.29	4.48	67
National Budget and Debt	0.28	4.29	280
Development and Housing, Other	0.26	4.00	25
Consumer Safety and Fraud	0.26	4.00	125
International Resources	0.23	3.57	56
Air Pollution, Global Warming	0.22	3.33	180
Rural Housing	0.20	3.08	65
Government Operations, General	0.17	2.61	230
Government Operations, Other	0.12	1.89	53
Anti-Government Activities	0.00	0.00	1
Drug and Alcohol Treatment	0.00	0.00	9
Migrant and Seasonal Workers,	0.00	0.00	32
U.S. and Other Defense Alliances	0.00	0.00	25
Space, Science, Tech, Other	0.00	0.00	9
International Affairs, South Africa	0.00	0.00	1
Panama Canal	0.00	0.00	11
International Affairs, Other	0.00	0.00	5

The mean subtopic score during this period is 1.04 with a standard deviation of .60