ENGL/COMM/WRDS: The Rhetoric of Fear » February 14th: Fascism and Other Valentine’s Day Atrocities

February 14th: Fascism and Other Valentine’s Day Atrocities

Plan for the Evening

  • Resetting Logical Fallacies
  • Question about Origin Stories
  • Statistical-ish Fallacies
  • More on Economics
  • Highlights from Introducing American Politics
  • Kevin Passmore’s Fascism: A Very Short Introduction (pp. 1-55)
  • Propaganda Fun Part 1 (of at least 3)
  • Conspiracy Theories–Presentation for SEACS

Happy Valentine’s Day!!! I hope cupid was good to you, but, if not, consider yourself lucky. Here’s a scientific study proving that in marriage presence make the heart grow cold…

Logical Fallacies Related to Statistics

Full disclosure: I did horribly in my statistics classes in college. I am not a statistician and am not claiming to debunk statistics. I only want us to think critically about them. After all, I use statistics that others compile for my own research, but quantifiable, measurable data isn’t the ONLY path to knowledge creation. The thing to remember, though, is facts don’t speak for themselves–someone or group compiles, verifies, and interprets data to prepare an argument or provide information. Because rhetoric is our discipline, it’s important to understand how one can (mis)use statistics.

Our previous two class pages (January 31st and February 7th) have information on key logical fallacies. I promised to group the statistical-ish ones together (might not be a bad Midterm Exam study guide), so I finally got around to it.

Appeal to Possibility (p. 75)

Withey tells us “catastrophizing” and assuming the worst are good examples. He tells us to reflect on the fact that “not everything that is possible is actual” (p. 75).

Several years ago, I saw a movie during a Sherlock Holmes film series (conducted by the great film professor, Sam Shapiro) that had an interesting reference to science. The quote from the movie made me think about how discoveries are often pursued along unlikely paths. Sometimes it can take radical thinking to advance science. Let’s read the quote from the film They Might be Giants (1971).

In the scene, Justin Playfair (really Sherlock Holmes) comments on Don Quixote’s foolish idea of attacking windmills as if they were giants. He says,

Of course, he carried it a bit too far. He thought that every windmill was a giant. That’s insane. But, thinking that they might be…Well, all the best minds used to think the world was flat. But, what if it isn’t? It might be round. And bread mold might be medicine. If we never looked at things and thought of what they might be, why, we’d all still be out there in the tall grass with the apes.

Justin Playfair [George C. Scott] in They Might Be Giants (1971)

Base Rate (p. 87)

This fallacy occurs when one ignores the overall probability of an event, say shark attacks, when considering a specific case, say concern for swimming in Florida, which has the most shark attacks in the United States. Therefore, you are more likely to be attacked by a shark in Florida than Hawaii. End of story, right?

One might be susceptible to think Green Jelly Beans cause acne.

Of course, I have to point out that the very low possibility of shark attacks is no consolation to the person being eaten by a shark…

Biased Sample (p. 93)

Are your sample sizes accurate, meaning is the sample size (n) representative of the population (N) you’re trying to learn about?

Cherry-Picking (p. 99)

One problem that can arise and call into question whether or not this is fallacious is a researcher’s boundaries. We can’t cover EVERYTHING about a topic, so we have to create boundaries for the study we plan to do. This will mean not including all types of information and, important for this discussion, all people (in a survey). For instance, if one were to want to learn about gamer interactions online, that researcher would need to limit their body of subjects (the corpus) to a manageable group. One couldn’t possibly survey or review ALL gamer interactions online. The goal is to be upfront and mention that this isn’t a generalizable study. Then, what’s the criteria for whom to study? Well, sometimes it’s who replies back, and other times it can be more systematic (e.g. I’ll contact every 10th person on this list of gamers). A more social science leaning research might not be satisfied with the generalizability of qualitative humanities research, but they don’t get to dictate what counts as research. After all, a strict commitment to empiricism might consider any non-generalizable research to be cherry picking. However, such a stance influences what one considers “proper” knowledge creation.

Fake Precision (p. 111)

Darrell Huff has an interesting take on this. We often say “99% of the time” to claim we do something nearly all the time; however, what’s the rhetoric of a more precise percentage even one that’s derived from sound statistical measurements?

Multiple Comparisons Fallacy (p. 146)

Withey sums up this fallacy when he writes, “Samples can help us make wider inferences but only within a certain margin of error” (p. 147). A good example of this is political polling: If you don’t get a representative sample, your polling can be off. Also, for a national election (like the Presidency), it makes little sense to base an outcome on a national poll because the Electoral College means we have to consider the states’ results. Even if a majority polled claim support for candidate X, those numbers aren’t the deciding factor in a Presidential election.

Lying with Stats (p. 134)

This is where Darrell Huff’s work is extremely important. I put that reading up on Canvas, and we can go to the How to Lie with Statistics webpage if we have time. Let’s cover the Al Gore Earth in the Balance (1992) point; then, we’ll dive into a more recent example of, if not lying, then, misrepresentation (Of course, a purposeful misrepresentation is lying).

Reflect on the following graph about income growth:

Pew Research Center. “Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality.” Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik, and Rakesh Kochhar (9 Jan. 2020)

The above graph shows that the top 5% of earners’ incomes grew the fastest during all time periods except 2001-2010, when the average of all incomes dropped. Yes. Because they have higher incomes, their losses in real amounts are greater. If you make more money and the tax rate stays the same (or increases), you will pay more money in taxes. Keep that in mind when we discuss the next myth that a more equitable distribution of wealth happened between 2017-2020.

The Myth of Income Distribution

From the end of 2016 through the end of 2019, real wealth for the bottom half of households grew at an annual rate of 17.2 percent, while real wealth for the top 1 percent of households grew at a 5.2 percent pace. Following landmark tax reform in 2017, real wealth for the bottom half of households grew at almost four times the pace of that of the top 1 percent.

National Review. “Setting the Record Straight on Wealth Inequality.” Cale Clingenpeel and Tyler Goodspeed (23 July 2021)

The Main “Facts” of the Article

  • 17.2 ÷ 5.2 = 3.3…not sure that’s “almost four times,” but it is just over three times the percentage growth.
  • During the Great Recession, real wealth for the bottom half of earners fell by 36.9% and dropped 13.7% for the top 1 percent of earners.
    • Let’s use $50K for income of “bottom half of earners”
      • $50K * 0.369% = $18,450
    • Let’s use $500K for top 1% of earners
      • $500K * 0.137 = $68,500
    • These estimates are for discussion purposes. Please feel free to research the exact averages for all income levels and report back to me…
    • Keep your eyes on the actual dollar amounts.
  • By the end of 2020, aggregate real wealth held by the bottom half of households was 21.9 percent
  • Aggregate real wealth among the top 1 percent of households was up 10.3 percent

What are the real numbers? The authors might have a bias. Cale Clingenpeel was Senior Adviser to the Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers during the Trump administration. Tyler Goodspeed is a Fellow at the Hoover Institution (notice their Director…). They are very committed to keeping taxes low.

They actually link to the source but fail to provide where they exactly got their annual rate calculations (para. 5) for a supposed increase in income distribution on the link they give in para. 3: DFA: Distributional Financial Accounts. Let’s attempt to reengineer their argument and look at wealth in real dollars. I found these number at the above link when I clicked on Explore the Distribution of Wealth Over Time (click on “Table” tab for amount in Trillions).* Incomes (and inflation) have changed since Clingenpeel & Goodspeed’s article came out, but I’m looking at the numbers from the time period they analyze, which was up to 2020.
*These numbers have been revised since I first started reviewing this after reading Clingenpeel & Goodspeed’s article in Fall 2021. See this class’s webpage from Fall 2022 if interested.

  • Bottom Half of Households wealth in Dollars (USD)
    • 1st Quarter 2017: $1.24T [$124*17.2%=$145.32*17.2%=$170.32*17.2%]=$1.996T
    • 1st Quarter 2020: $2.05T {close enough to $1.996T, and 17.2% is most likely an average}
    • Percentage increase: 65.3% over three years
    • Dollar amount increase: $81B
  • Top 1% of Households wealth in Dollars (USD) {Add top 0.1% to 99-99.9%}
    • 1st Quarter 2017: $27.9T [27.9*5.2%=$29.35*5.2%=$30.87*5.2%]=$32.48T
    • 1st Quarter 2020: $30.2T {5.2% seems a bit high of an estimate, but DFA might have revised the amounts after Clingenpeel & Goodspeed’s article came out.}
    • Percentage increase: 8.24% over three years
    • Dollar amount increase: $2.3T…notice the T for Trillion
  • Bottom Half of Households wealth in Dollars (USD)
    • 4th Quarter 2016: $1.21T
    • 4th Quarter 2019: $2.11T
    • Percentage increase: 74.3% over three years
    • Dollar amount increase: $90B
  • Top 1% of Households wealth in Dollars (USD) {Add top 0.1% to 99-99.9%}
    • 4th Quarter 2016: $27.04T
    • 4th Quarter 2019: $33.33T
    • Percentage increase: over 23.2% over three years
    • Dollar amount increase: $6.29T

Is the above assumption that the bottom half’s income distribution increased warranted based on dollar amounts? Also, if they’re using specific dollar amounts to get the percentages they derive, where exactly are those amounts? I might have assumed the wrong numbers in the above calculations, but what was I supposed to assume? It’s unethical not to be accurate in identifying the exact data for your arguments. If “unethical” is too strong, then let’s say it’s “sloppy” research not to be accurate–don’t just give a link and expect us to do the work. If the reader has to guess or can’t trace back the actual data used, the source is being unethical. Let’s be clear: I think they’re just liars.

Just so we’re clear: Economists revise results all the time and adjust previous estimates, so some calculations can fluctuate, but they usually aren’t drastic changes. Some of the numbers from the DFA will be revised in the future. Clingenpeel & & Goodspeed are mostly correct about the percentage increases, but they do not take into account that one group’s real dollar amount is measured in Billions while the other is measured in Trillions.

And The Rhetoric of Fear…

Of course, you might be asking what all this economic stuff has to do with rhetoric and, specifically, the rhetoric of fear. While I think the above problems are defined in the Ludic Fallacy, the bigger picture is that appeals regarding the state of the economy happen all the time. Speakers invoke fears of recession, depression, unemployment, etc. to move an audience on a position. The problem is that we rarely dive into the theories and assume the sound bites are enough.

Kevin Passmore’s Fascism: A Very Short Introduction

As I mentioned previously, this book is important to explore the definition of fascism. This term gets thrown around quite a lot, so I think it’s important to learn more about its history in a class on rhetoric of fear because it is an emotionally charge term. Here are some highlights from the first third of the book (pp. 1-55).

  • p. xiii: a note on definitions
  • p. 1: Mussolini’s income from being an editor “was insufficient to maintain his wife and three children, his mistress, and his liking for fencing, dueling, and fast cars.”
  • p. 1: “He had left the Socialist Party because it opposed Italian intervention in the Great War [WW1].”
  • p. 2: “The term ‘fasces’….simultaneously appealed to Liberals and nationalists because in ancient Rome it symbolized authority.”
  • p. 3: “…by the 1930s, many people would see the struggle between fascism and antifascism as the primary issue in domestic and international politics.”
  • p. 5: Box 1 [characteristics of fascism]
  • p. 7: “…the Communist International in 1935…stated that ‘Fascism in power is the open, terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic and most imperialistic elements of finance capitalism.'”
  • p. 8: “…capitalists used the Fascist movement to destroy socialism….Fascists were able to persuade [the petty bourgeoisie] that its interest lay in defending property against socialism.”
  • p. 9: “…capitalism is such a powerful force that it can prosper under any regime that does not actually destroy it.”
  • p. 10: Via Max Weber–“Fascism was primarily an antimodern movement…”
    • “…the mass of the population becomes vulnerable to fascism when social change is particularly rapid.”
  • p. 11: “To the victims of modernization,* fascism provides a total explanation of their place in the world…and provides a blueprint for restoration.”
    • “…the Weberian approach shares the Marxist assumption that the elites are able to manipulate the rest of the population–especially the petty bourgeoisie–at will.”
  • p. 12: From C. J. Friedrich….
    “2. A system of terror by the police and secret police which is directed against real and imagined enemies of the regime.
    6. An elaborate ideology which covers all aspects of man’s existence and which contains a powerful chiliastic [messianic or religious] moment.”
  • p. 12: Utopianism always leads to terror.
  • p. 14: “Emilio Gentile….modernization caused the destruction of traditional religion, without undermining the mass’s desire to believe.”
  • p. 15: “…big business and the family (within limits) were more or less compatible with [fascist leaders] understanding of the mobilized nation. Communism and feminism were not.”
  • pp. 16-21: Passmore’s reflection on defining F/fascism. It’s not as important to dwell on Passmore’s process, but it is a nice presentation of how one thinks through defining something in academic terms. What’s important for right now is that the connotation of “fascism” invokes both Italian Fascism as well as Nazism of the 3rd Reich. It’s productive to recognize the similarities of those movements, systems, historical moments; it’s less productive (for us) to worry about deciding the definition of fascism–lower-case ‘f’.
  • p. 17: “…[fascists] opposed feminism, but set up women’s groups in the party.”
    • Very interesting…any similarities you can point to to contemporary times?
  • p. 20: “In the case of fascism, few will assume the label, but the very gravity of the charge makes it a tempting effective accusation to stick on opponents.”
    • This is rhetoric and DEFINITELY within our purview.
  • p. 27-28: “Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion that societies should be regulated by one such universal ideal, the ‘general will….taken up by the most revolutionary of the French Revolutionaries during the Terror of 1793, the Jacobins.”
  • p. 28: “…that irrational crowds could be manipulated by demagogues.”
  • p. 32: Technologies reaching the masses.
  • p. 37: “Teachers had led the struggle to ‘make’ Italians.”
  • p. 38: “…enrollment of workers into new corporatist bodies, loyal to the Italian nation.”
  • p. 49: In Italy circa 1922, “Politicians, business, and army agreed that it was better to bring the Fascists into the government…”
  • p. 50: “Now that the Party was in government, conservatives flooded into it, reassured by repression of the left and espousal of liberal economics.
  • p. 51: Collective individuals–“[Italian Nationalist Association] INA remained powerful, and they wanted a strong state to nationalize Italians and restore bourgeois society through discipline and hierarchy.”

Propaganda Fun Part 1

There’s a 2005 documentary that is appropriate for this class (but, perhaps, not appropriate without critique). I have the DVD, but Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against The West is online, so let’s watch to 21:45.

Next Class

I hope to have comments on your Critical Thinking Drafts this coming Sunday (2/19) or Monday (2/20). Keep up with the syllabus reading, and we’ll catch up next week on what we missed tonight.